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327 
LEGAL FICTIONS AND MORAL REASONING:  
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE MENTALLY 
RETARDED DEFENDANT AFTER PENRY V. 
JOHNSON 
Timothy S. Hall* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between mental health law and criminal law is dis-
turbing in both its substance and its scope.  If it is true that the task of 
lawyering is that of enabling the client to have his story told,1 it is cer-
tainly true that nowhere are clients’ stories more complex than in the in-
tersection between criminal law and mental health law.  This Article in-
volves one such intersection: the relationship between mental retardation 
and capital punishment.  Staggering numbers of inmates suffer from of-
ten debilitating mental disabilities.  Estimates of the incidence of mental 
retardation in American’s death row population range from 4%2 to as 
high as 20%.3  There are no definitive statistics on this, however.  Alt-
hough the Department of Justice keeps track of death row inmates ac-
cording to their race, sex, education, marital status and criminal history, 
                                                          
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louis-
ville. J.D. 1993 Cornell Law School.  Thanks to my research assistant, Samer Yahyawi, for invalua-
ble assistance in the preparation of this Article. 
 1. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: To-
wards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992) (analyzing the law-
yer’s role as translator of the defendant’s story in the legal system). 
 2. Joan Petersilia, Justice for All?, Offenders with Mental Retardation and the California 
Corrections System, 12/1/97 PRISON J. 358380 (1997). 
 3. Cf. Bruce A. Robinson, Facts About Capital Punishment – The Death Penalty (June 8, 
1995) at http://www.religioustolerance.org/execut3.htm. (last modified Oct. 24, 2001) (fifteen per-
cent); Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American Bar As-
sociation’s Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Calling for a 
Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 40 (1996) (between twelve and 
twenty percent). 
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among other characteristics,4 no such data are available on the mental 
health status of those whom the government proposes to execute.5  One 
commentator has stated that approximately 24 mentally retarded indi-
viduals have been executed in the years since the Supreme Court ex-
pressly allowed the states to apply the death penalty to the mentally re-
tarded;6 no one knows how many mentally retarded individuals have 
been executed over the years.7 
One of the most compelling stories to arise at the intersection of 
criminal and mental health law is that of Johnny Paul Penry.  Penry is a 
convicted rapist and murderer who since 1986 has lived on death row in 
Texas.  He is also a survivor of brutal, long-term child abuse and organic 
brain damage, who exhibits the intellectual  functioning of a seven-year-
old child.8  Penry is a central character in one of the great legal/ethical 
debates of the late 20th century —- the debate over the justifiability of 
executing the mentally retarded.  The Supreme Court has twice heard 
Penry’s appeal from his death sentence, and has twice found the proce-
dures used by the State of Texas in imposing that sentence to be incom-
patible with the protections offered by the federal Constitution.  This Ar-
ticle will focus on Penry’s case after the first Supreme Court decision in 
1989 (“Penry I”).  We will examine Texas’ attempt to comply with the 
mandate of Penry I in re-trying and re-sentencing Penry, and the Court’s 
rejection of that attempt in 2001.  We will see that Texas tried to use a 
legal fiction to comply with the demands of Penry I, rather than enact 
changes in its statutory capital sentencing scheme.  This fiction was the 
linchpin of the Supreme Court’s rejection of Penry’s death sentence in 
2001 (“Penry II.”) 
Part II of this Article sketches the outlines of the relationship be-
tween mental disability and criminal law, considering historic and mod-
ern justifications for special consideration of the mentally disabled in the 
criminal justice system and the relationship between insanity, incompe-
tence and mental retardation in modern American jurisprudence.  Part III 
traces the ongoing fifteen-year saga of Johnny Paul Penry’s case through 
                                                          
 4. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 2000, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cp00.htm (last modified Dec. 11, 2001) (including legal sta-
tus, age, execution method). 
 5. Petersilia, supra note 2. 
 6. Bryan L. Duplar, Another Look at Evolving Standards: Will Decency Prevail Against Ex-
ecuting the Mentally Retarded?, 52 Okla. L. Rev. 593, 609 (1999). 
 7. For examples of mentally retarded individuals who have been executed, see Coyne & 
Entzeroth, supra note 3, at 41-43. 
 8. For explanation and criticism of the “mental age” concept as applied to legal determina-
tions of competency, see infra notes 111 and accompanying text. 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 3, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss3/1
HALL1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:52 PM 
2002] PENRY V. JOHNSON 329 
the courts.  Part IV examines the relationship between legal fictions and 
capital punishment historically and in Penry’s case in particular, and ar-
ticulates reasons why the use of legal fictions to implement change has 
been criticized in the past, and was rejected by the Supreme Court in this 
setting. Part V outlines the contours of a constitutionally sufficient death 
penalty sentencing scheme after Penry II, and raises further questions 
which may be settled by the Court in the near future. 
II.  A BRIEF OUTLINE OF MENTAL DISABILITY AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 
A.  Doctrines of Mental Disability and Criminal Law 
The death penalty has been imposed with more or less frequency 
throughout the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence, but one con-
stant feature of death penalty jurisprudence has been the idea that the 
mental status of the defendant affects the suitability or justifiability of 
the death penalty; that is, that trial, punishment and execution of the 
mentally disabled may not be desirable.  Under current law, there are es-
sentially three doctrines under which the mental status of a mentally dis-
abled9 capital defendant will enter into the trial and sentencing process: 
insanity, incompetence and mental retardation.10 
1.  Insanity 
The first criminal law doctrine related to mental disability, and the 
most familiar, is the insanity defense.  Unlike incompetence and mental 
retardation, insanity is an exculpatory doctrine —- the defendant who 
successfully asserts insanity at his11 trial has traditionally been acquit-
ted,12 with no further responsibility to the correctional system.13  The in-
                                                          
 9. For the purposes of this discussion, I will use the term “mentally disabled” to encompass 
those defendants who are either legally insane, legally incompetent to either stand trial or be execut-
ed, or mentally retarded. 
 10. While complete expositions of the doctrines of insanity and incompetence are beyond the 
scope of this Article this section will provide a brief description of each. 
 11. Although these doctrines theoretically apply both to men and women, men are in fact the 
vast majority of capital convicts. In 2000, of 3,593 prisoners on death row, only 54 were women.  
Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 4.  This Article will thus use the male pronoun when refer-
ring to capital defendants generally. 
 12. CHARLES E. TORCIA, 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 105, at 33 (15th ed. 1994).  How-
ever, recent years have seen a proliferation of “guilty but mentally ill” verdicts, which allow pun-
ishment of those who might otherwise have been acquitted under traditional “insanity” doctrines. 
 13. The insanity acquittee is, of course, subject to incarceration in a mental hospital, but gen-
3
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sanity defense has always been difficult to plead and prove successfully.  
Sir Edward Coke held that the defense should be limited to those who 
“wholly loseth their memory and understanding,”14 and in 1723, Justice 
Tracy wrote that in order to invoke the defense, “a man must be totally 
deprived of his understanding and memory so as not to know what he is 
doing, no more than an infant, brute or wild beast.”15  The insanity de-
fense was famously considered and articulated after the celebrated case 
of M’Naghten,16 in which the assassin of British Prime Minister Robert 
Peel’s private secretary was acquitted of the charge of murder by reason 
of insanity.  In the popular and royal outrage17 over this verdict, popular-
ly believed to have been a miscarriage of justice, the Queen requested 
the House of Lords to clarify the proper scope of the insanity defense.18  
In response, the Lords articulated the rule that: 
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly 
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused 
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, 
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he 
did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.19 
This definition of insanity has captured the imagination of the legal 
system ever since, and proposals for reform, whether restrictive or ex-
pansive, are measured by it.  A common criticism of the M’Naghten test 
is that it focuses solely on defects of reason; whereas according to mod-
ern views of mental health professionals, the mentally ill may intellectu-
ally understand their behavior but for other reasons having to do with 
their illness, be unable to control or conform their conduct to the re-
quirements of the law.20  In response to this and other criticisms, various 
                                                          
erally only until he no longer meets the statutory standards for involuntary hospitalization, generally 
focusing on whether the patient presents an imminent danger of harm to himself or others.  See, e.g.,  
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (LEXIS through 2001 Legis. Sess.).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that states may not “warehouse” the mentally ill solely by reason of their illness, or for rea-
sons of past violent acts, except as those past acts bear on future dangerousness.  See O’Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding a state cannot constitutionally confine without more, a 
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom). 
 14. GARY B. MENTON ET AL, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A 
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 190 (2d ed. 1997). 
 15. Id. 
 16. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), reprinted in All E.R. Rep. 229. 
 17. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 617 (2d Cir. 1966) (outlining a brief history of 
M’Naghten’s Case and Queen Victoria’s response). 
 18. Id. 
 19. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843) reprinted in All E.R. Rep. 229. 
 20. Freeman, 357 F.2d at 618-19 (arguing the test permits the jury to identify those persons 
who cannot control their behavior which results in a prison sentence instead of confinement to a 
4
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reformulations of the insanity defense have been proposed and adopted 
by various courts.  The “irresistible impulse” test,21 the Durham test,22 
the Model Penal Code test23 and the Federal Insanity Defense Reform 
Act test24 have all been adopted in one or more jurisdictions, at least 
temporarily.25  Although the various tests for insanity differ, there is 
broad agreement on the basic principle that if the defendant, at the time 
of committing the crime, was sufficiently mentally disordered, criminal 
responsibility for the act does not attach, and punishment is improper.  
Punishment is generally regarded as improper because punishment of a 
defendant who is sufficiently mentally disordered to satisfy the appro-
priate insanity test cannot produce a desirable deterrent effect; the se-
verely mentally disordered being essentially undeterrable and the men-
tally disordered defendant having little or no moral culpability for his 
actions.26 
2.  Competence 
If the mentally disabled defendant chooses not to assert an insanity 
defense, or is unable to successfully prove insanity, his competence may 
nonetheless be raised as a legal issue.27  A criminal defendant must be 
                                                          
mental institution). 
 21. Torcia, supra note 12, § 102 at 18. 
 22. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (1954) (was the criminal act the “product” 
of defendant’s mental disease?). 
 23. United States v. Massa, 804 F.2d 1020, 1022-23 (1986).  The test is: 
A defendant is insane * * * if at the time of the alleged criminal conduct, as a result of 
mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
As used in this Article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include any abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal behavior or otherwise antisocial conduct. 
Id.  (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Final Draft 1962)). 
 24.  
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that, at the time of 
the commission of acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of severe men-
tal disease or defect, as unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness 
of his acts.  Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. 
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Public Law 98-473, Sec. 401-06 (1984). 
 25. The “product of mental disease” test of Durham was only adopted in the District of Co-
lumbia, and was overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (1972). 
 26. Cf. United States v. Austin, 533 F.2d 879, 889 (3d Cir. 1976). (Adams, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting the goals of the insanity defense include “punishing only those who act with criminal 
intent” and “avoiding punishment for . . . those who are not morally blameworthy for their acts or 
those who are not deterrable”). 
 27. Typical competence statutes require the court to hold a hearing into the defendant’s com-
petence sua sponte if the court has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence.  Cf. KY REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 504.100(1) (Baldwin’s WESTLAW through 2001 Legis. Sess.). 
5
Hall: Penry v. Johnson
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
HALL1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:52 PM 
332 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3/4 
competent at the time of his trial, or trial must be continued until compe-
tence is established.  If the defendant never regains competence, he may 
not be tried.28 
The doctrine of competence arises out of the Constitutional doc-
trines of due process and effective assistance of counsel.  If a criminal 
defendant is so mentally disabled that he cannot effectively aid his coun-
sel at trial, then the risk of a miscarriage of justice—of convicting an in-
nocent man—is unacceptably high.  The United States Supreme Court 
has clarified the requirement of competence under the Constitution:29  
[T]he test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present abil-
ity to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational un-
derstanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the pro-
ceedings against him.30 
Thus, there is a two-prong test for competency: ability to under-
stand the proceedings and ability to assist counsel in his defense. 
The competency requirement is more directly related to the imposi-
tion of capital punishment than is the insanity defense.  While the insani-
ty defense looks to the time of commission of the offense in order to de-
cide whether the defendant should be exculpated of criminal 
responsibility for his acts,31 the competency requirement looks to the de-
fendant’s mental status at the time of his interaction with the legal sys-
tem.  This inquiry into the defendant’s present mental status has at least 
three justifications.  First, if the defendant cannot cooperate with coun-
sel, potentially exculpatory evidence will be unavailable to the court.  
Second, if the defendant cannot understand the proceedings against him, 
the punishment imposed loses much of its moral force —- it does not 
further social policy to impose suffering needlessly; or where there is no 
understanding of its purpose.  Finally, some argue that the execution of 
an incompetent convict carries no deterrent effect.32  These justifications 
                                                          
 28. KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.090 (Baldwin’s WESTLAW through 2001 Legis. Sess.).  The 
issue of competence need not be specifically pleaded by the defendant - the court may, indeed must, 
raise the issue sua sponte if appropriate.  See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.100 (Baldwin’s 
WESTLAW through 2001 Legis. Sess.) (“If .. during any stage of the proceedings, the court has 
reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial, the court shall [order an 
evaluation and hold a hearing]”) (emphasis added). 
 29. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Drope v. Missouri, 420 US 162, 179 (1975). 
 30. Dusky, 362 US at 402. 
 31. See supra sec. II. A. 1. 
 32. Kacie McCoy Daugherty, Comment, Synthetic Sanity: The Ethics and Legality of Using 
Psychotropic Medications to Render Death Row Inmates Competent for Execution, 17 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 715, 718-19 (2001) (arguing that executing an incompetent person will not 
deter others).  But see, Richard J. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty: Conscien-
6
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give rise to the relationship between capital punishment and compe-
tence: the Supreme Court has held unequivocally that competence is a 
prerequisite to execution.33  The finality of a death sentence makes it 
particularly compelling that the defendant have had every opportunity to 
present exculpatory evidence.  If he is executed while incompetent, the 
possibility exists that he might have revealed new evidence at death’s 
door, had he understood the consequences of remaining silent.34  Fur-
ther, the incompetent defendant does not understand the nature of the 
punishment, nor why it is being inflicted upon him.35  Execution of a 
convict in such circumstances violates our standards of humane con-
duct,36 and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the 
Eighth Amendment.37 
3.  Mental Retardation 
Finally, criminal courts may consider the defendant’s mental retar-
dation.  Unlike insanity, mental retardation has traditionally not been 
seen as exculpatory. Nor does mental retardation alone prevent the State 
from conducting a trial and imposing punishment. Estimates of the inci-
dence of mental retardation in American prisons and jails reach as high 
as 20%.38  Clearly, mental retardation does not preclude at least some 
                                                          
tious Abstention, Professional Ethics and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
67 (1990) (“The traditional arguments for the prohibition against executing the incompetent are 
amazingly weak,” yet finding support for the rule in the human dignity of the condemned, which is 
deprived if the incompetent are executed.) 
 33. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).  The second justification for the competency 
requirement is not interpreted to mean that a sentence of incarceration, fine or other punishment 
may not be imposed if the convict is incompetent at the time of the sentence; presumably, in cases 
of punishment less than death, the social policy favoring certainty of punishment overrides the poli-
cy requiring an understanding of that punishment by the convict. 
 34. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 LAWS OF ENGLAND 395 (Callaghan & Cockcroft 1871).  
“[T]hough a man be compos when he commits a capital crime, yet if he becomes non compos after, 
he shall not be indicted; if after indictment, he shall not be convicted; if after conviction, he shall 
not receive judgment; if after judgment, he shall not be ordered for execution: for . . . the law knows 
not but he might have offered some reason, if in his senses, to have stayed these respective proceed-
ings.”  Id. 
 35. Ford, 477 U.S. at 421. 
 36. See Id. at 409 (Marshall, J.) (“[E]xecution of an insane person quite simply offends hu-
manity”); Id. at 421 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[M]ost men and women value the opportunity to pre-
pare, mentally and spiritually, for their death.”). 
 37. Id. at 409-10. 
 38. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.  The landmark U.S. Supreme Court case 
striking down the discretionary death penalty, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), exhibited a 
degree of concern with the possible mental retardation of two of the three defendants in the cases at 
bar.  Id. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring).  Furman, convicted of murdering a homeowner in the 
course of a robbery, was diagnosed as having mild to moderate mental deficiency with psychotic 
7
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types of punishment, and the incapacities associated with mental retarda-
tion39 do not, unless they rise to the level of incompetence, necessarily 
prevent a fair and just trial.40  However, most developed countries,41 as 
well as several states and the federal government,42 have chosen to bar 
the execution of the mentally retarded convicted of otherwise capital 
crimes.  At least two reasons for this blanket ban have been articulated.  
First, it is argued that execution of the mentally retarded serves no deter-
rent effect.43  Second, all mentally retarded individuals, by definition, 
suffer from “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” as well as 
“significant limitations in adaptive functioning.”44  Thus, despite the 
wide variability in severity of mental retardation,45 all individuals with 
mental retardation are sufficiently impaired to justify exempting them 
from the death penalty.46 
Interestingly, while insanity and incompetence are purely legal con-
structs, corresponding to no specific mental health diagnoses,47 legal 
treatment of mental retardation in the capital sentencing field is differ-
ent. Drafters of statutes exempting individuals with mental retardation 
from the death penalty have borrowed heavily from modern definitions 
                                                          
episodes.  Id. at 252-53.  Branch, a convict sentenced to death in Texas for rape, had been “found to 
be a borderline mental deficient and well below the average IQ of Texas prison inmates.  Id. at 253.  
He had the equivalent of five and a half years of grade school education.  Id.  He had a “dull intelli-
gence” and “was in the lowest fourth percentile of his class.” 
 39. Although by definition, mentally retarded individuals suffer from intellectual impairment, 
the extent of that impairment varies greatly.  See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307-10 (1989) 
[hereinafter Penry I]; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 40-42 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (defining degrees of 
severity of mental retardation). 
 40. However, personality traits associated with the mentally retarded, including the desire to 
please authority figures and suggestibility, may produce questionable results in criminal investiga-
tions under circumstances which ordinarily would not raise doubts about, for example, the validity 
of an apparently uncoerced confession.  See generally ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE?: WHAT 
CAN HAPPEN WHEN PERSONS WITH RETARDATION OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 
ENCOUNTER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991) (discussing misunderstood responses and the 
judicial system’s response to persons with mental illness). 
 41. See supra sec. II. C. 
 42. For the limited purposes of the Federal Drug Abuse Act, see Penry I, 492 U.S. at 344. 
 43. Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that executing mentally retarded offenders 
does not measurably further the penal goals of retribution or deterrence). 
 44. DSM-IV, supra note 39, at 39 (describing the diagnosis of mental retardation). 
 45. Id. at 40-41. 
 46. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending the mentally retarded lack 
the full degree of responsibility for their crimes which is a predicate for the death penalty). 
 47. DSM-IV, supra note 39, at xxiii (“[D]angers arise because of the imperfect fit between 
the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagno-
sis. . . . . . . assignment of a particular diagnosis does not imply a specific level of impairment or 
disability”). 
8
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of mental retardation in defining the category of exemption. 
According to the DSM-IV, an individual is mentally retarded when, 
prior to attaining the age of 18, he exhibits: 
A.  Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning: an IQ of approx-
imately 70 or below on an individually administered IQ test; [and] 
B.  Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive function-
ing . . . in at least two of the following areas: communication, self-care, 
home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, 
self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and 
safety.48 
Mental retardation is further classified into degrees of severity, de-
pending on the “level of intellectual impairment”49 demonstrated by an 
individual.  These are Mild Mental Retardation, consisting of individuals 
with IQ of approximately 50-55 to 70, and constituting 85% of the popu-
lation of mentally retarded individuals; Moderate Mental Retardation, 
consisting of individuals with IQ of approximately 35-40 to 50-55, and 
constituting 10% of the population of mentally retarded individuals; Se-
vere Mental Retardation, consisting of individuals with IQ of approxi-
mately 20-25 to 35-40 and constituting 3-4% of the population of men-
tally retarded individuals, and Profound Mental Retardation, consisting 
of individuals with IQ lower than 20-25 and constituting 1-2% of the 
population of mentally retarded individuals.50 
Modern sentencing laws, to the extent they take mental retardation 
into account, closely reflect these diagnostic standards in language 
drawn almost word-for-word from the DSM-IV.  Thus, Kentucky ex-
empts from the death penalty the “seriously mentally retarded,”51 de-
fined as those “defendant[s] with significantly subaverage intellectual 
functioning existing concurrently with substantial deficits in adaptive 
behavior and manifested during the developmental period[.]”52  Similar-
ly, North Carolina exempts from the death penalty the “mentally retard-
                                                          
 48. Id. at 46. 
 49. Id. at 40. 
 50. Id. at 41-42. 
 51. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.140 (LEXSTAT, LEXIS through 2001 Legis. Sess.). 
 52.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (LEXSTAT, LEXIS through 2001 Legis. Sess.).  It is 
not clear why the Kentucky legislature felt the need to define these individuals as “seriously” men-
tally retarded, as this is not a diagnostic category, but might lead to confusion with the “moderate” 
and “severe” diagnostic classifications.  To avoid such confusion, Kentucky specifies that “seriously 
mentally retarded” applies to those individuals with an IQ of 70 or lower.   KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
532.130(2) (LEXSTAT, LEXIS through 2001 Legis. Sess.). 
9
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ed,” defined in almost identical wording as the DSM-IV.53 
B.  Recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
The death penalty has been the subject of intense scrutiny by the 
courts and commentators.  A full discussion of the Supreme Court’s 
death penalty jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this or any law re-
view article,54 and indeed has filled many articles and books.55  Howev-
er, a brief review of the Court-mandated requirements for jury delibera-
tions in death penalty cases will be useful as we examine the jury’s 
decisions in the Penry cases. 
1.  Basic Constitutional Requirements 
June 29, 1972 is the pivotal date in American death penalty juris-
prudence.  On that day, the Supreme Court decided the case of Furman 
v. Georgia.56 In Furman, the Court found that the death penalty was ad-
ministered in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, effectively putting a stop to all cap-
ital sentencing and executions in the United States.  Although the Court 
found that current laws provided inadequate safeguards against improper 
use of jury discretion to impose the death penalty, it did not hold that a 
Constitutionally adequate death penalty statute was impossible.  As a re-
sult, many states set about revising their death penalty laws after Furman 
v. Georgia, in an attempt to satisfy the Court’s concerns about unfettered 
and arbitrary discretion in capital cases.57 
                                                          
 53. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2005 (West, WESTLAW through S.L. 2001-450) provides 
that: 
(a) (1) The following definitions apply in this section:  
a. Mentally retarded. - Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning, existing 
concurrently with significant limitations in adaptive functioning, both of which were 
manifested before the age of 18. 
b. Significant limitations in adaptive functioning. - Significant limitations in two or more 
of the following adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social 
skills, community use, self- direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure 
skills and work skills. 
c. Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning. - An intelligence quotient of 
70 or below. 
 54. For an excellent overview of the cases briefly discussed herein, see Coyne & Entzeroth, 
supra note 3, at 7-10. 
 55. For a review of such publications, see Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded 
Criminal Defendant to Death: Charting the National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded 
from the Death Penalty, 52 ALA. L. REV. 911 (2001). 
 56. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 57. Coyne & Entzeroth, supra note 3, at 7. 
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In 1976, the Court heard arguments in five consolidated cases aris-
ing out of the revised death penalty statutes of Georgia,58 Florida,59 Lou-
isiana,60 North Carolina61 and Texas.62  The Court held that, although the 
statutes of North Carolina and Florida, which attempted to minimize jury 
discretion by imposing mandatory death sentences, were unconstitution-
al, the statutes of Georgia, Florida and Texas appropriately “guided and 
channeled”63 the jury’s discretion in capital cases, “eliminating total ar-
bitrariness and capriciousness in . . . imposition” of the death penalty.64  
The Court also demanded that constitutionally adequate capital sentenc-
ing schemes permit “particularized consideration of relevant aspects of 
the character and record of each convicted defendant . . . .”65  The ten-
sion faced by the drafters of capital sentencing procedures, then, is to 
provide sufficient guidance and restraint on unfettered jury discretion to 
meet the demands of Furman, while retaining sufficient discretion to im-
pose a sentence less than death in response to mitigating evidence of-
fered by the defendant.66  This individualized determination requires that 
the jury remain free to express its “reasoned moral response” to the de-
fendant’s character.67 
2.  Application of the Death Penalty to the Mentally Incompetent: 
Ford v. Wainwright 
Ford v. Wainwright68 involved a defendant convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death in 1974.  Although not claimed to have been in-
sane at the time he committed the offense,69 Ford developed behavioral 
peculiarities during his tenure on death row, including a paranoid obses-
sion centered on the Ku Klux Klan,70  and delusions of power and con-
trol.71  Ford’s treating psychiatrist concluded that Ford suffered from a 
                                                          
 58. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 59. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 60. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
 61. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 62. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 63. Proffitt, 428 US at 258. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. 
 66. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
 67. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)(O’Connor, J., concurring) 
 68. Ford, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 69. The insanity defense, which is an exculpatory doctrine, depends on the defendant’s mental 
state at the time the crime was committed.  See infra notes 11-27 and accompanying text. 
 70. Ford, 477 U.S. at 402. 
 71. Ford reported that he had appointed nine justices to the Florida Supreme Court, and re-
ferred to himself as “Pope.”  Id.  Ironically, one of Ford’s delusions, and one that carried some 
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mental disorder “severe enough to substantially affect Mr. Ford’s present 
ability to assist in the defense of his life.”72  After ordering a review of 
Ford’s mental condition by three psychiatrists,73 the Governor refused to 
grant clemency without explanation, simply issuing a death warrant by 
way of decision.74 
Ford appealed his death warrant to the Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari.75  The Supreme Court’s decision in Ford consists of 
two parts. First, by a 5-4 majority, the Court determined that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids the execution of an inmate who is incompetent76 at 
the time of execution.77  Second, the Court considered the procedures in 
place in Florida for determining the competency of an inmate, and found 
these procedures wanting by a plurality opinion.78 
In determining that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
“cruel and unusual punishment” bars the execution of incompetents, Jus-
                                                          
weight with the Court, was that he could not be executed “because of the landmark case I won.  
Ford v. State will prevent executions all over.”  Id. at 403 (1986) (quoting remark by Ford to his 
evaluating psychiatrist, Dr. Harold Kaufman).  Ford’s delusion, at least in part, turned out to be one 
of the grounds for the Court’s finding that he could not understand the nature of the punishment.  Id. 
at 422-23 (Powell, J., concurring) (“According to petitioner’s proffered psychiatric examination, 
petitioner does not know that he is to be executed, but rather believes that the death penalty has been 
invalidated. . . . . . . petitioner cannot connect his execution to the crime for which he was convict-
ed.”). 
 72. Id. at 403. 
 73. Pursuant to Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 2001).  In fact, the three psy-
chiatrists examined Ford for a combined total of half an hour before writing their separate opinions 
to the Governor.  Ford was not allowed to present his own evidence, under the Governor’s policy 
that prohibited advocacy on the part of the condemned.  Ford, 477 U.S. at 412-13.  For a discussion 
of the ethics of physician participation in competency evaluations when capital punishment is at 
stake, see Rochelle G. Salguero, Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to be Executed, 96 YALE L. 
J. 167 (1986). 
 74. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404. 
 75. Ford v. Wainright, 474 U.S. 1019 (1985). 
 76. Although Justice Marshall’s opinion speaks in terms of Ford’s “insanity,” the analysis 
adopted by the Court is that of competency; i.e, does the inmate, at the time of evaluation, under-
stand the nature of the death penalty and the reasons for its imposition.  Cf. Ford, 477 U.S. at 420-
27 (Powell, J., concurring); compare supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text (test for competence 
to stand trial).  The Court also uses the terms insanity and incompetence imprecisely.  Cf. Ford 477 
U.S. at 420-21.  While an “insane” defendant may also be incompetent, there is no necessary link 
between the two doctrines.  In fact, “insanity” itself is an imprecise legal construct capable of many 
definitions.  See supra notes 11-27 and accompanying text.  In an attempt to clarify the doctrines, 
this Article will speak of Ford and its requirements in terms of “competence” to be executed, analo-
gous to the “competency” to stand trial discussed infra.  Cf. Ford, 477 U.S. at 421 (Powell, J., con-
curring).  See FL. STAT. ANN. § 922.07 (West 2001) (requiring a stay of execution for those “who 
do not have the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was im-
posed,” cited in Ford, 477 U.S. at 421. 
 77. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401-10. 
 78. Id. at 410-18. 
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tice Marshall articulated a two-part test.  First, the Court inquires wheth-
er the practice in question was considered cruel and unusual under Eng-
lish law at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.79  Second, the 
Court inquires whether, even if not proscribed at the time of adoption, 
the practice in question has become cruel and unusual under the “evolv-
ing standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”80  
Execution of the incompetent passes both tests handily; the Court found 
that the ban on such executions “bears impressive historical creden-
tials,”81 and that such executions are approved by “virtually no authori-
ty . . . [in] English common law.”82 
The unanimity of condemnation of the execution of the incompe-
tent is not matched by “unanimity of rationale”83 for the ban.  Between 
them, Marshall’s majority opinion and Powell’s concurring opinion offer 
no fewer than six distinct rationales for the ban.  First and most broadly, 
the practice is said to “offend[] humanity,”84 presumably meaning that it 
is simply considered uncivilized for society to so avenge itself on the 
person of one patently disabled by mental illness.  Second, it is said that 
execution of an incompetent fails to provide the deterrence sought to be 
achieved by the death penalty.85  Ordinary citizens would presumably 
not see anything of themselves in one so disabled; and would not derive 
any moral lesson from such an execution.86  Third, the incompetent’s 
lack of understanding about the finality of the death penalty robs him of 
any oppportunity to prepare himself for death in a religious or spiritual 
sense.87  Fourth, the incompetence of the condemned is seen to be its 
own punishment, making the imposition of the death penalty a meaning-
less redundancy.88  Fifth, the retributionist nature of the death penalty is 
not served by taking the “lesser value[d]” life of the condemned  in ex-
change for the life of his victim.89  Finally, the execution of the incom-
petent robs him of the opportunity to offer exculpatory evidence, should 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 405 (“The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment embraces, at 
a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the 
time that the Bill of Rights was adopted.”) 
 80. Id. at 406 (quoting Trop v Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 81. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406. 
 82. Id. at 408. 
 83. Id. 
 84. SIR EDWARD COKE, 3 INSTITUTES 6 (6th ed. 1680), cited in Ford, 477 U.S. at 407. 
 85. Ford, 477 U.S. at 407. 
 86. Id. at 419 (Powell, J., concurring) 
 87. Id. at 407. 
 88. Id. at 408. 
 89. Id. (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & David W. Louisell, Death, the State and the In-
sane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 387 (1962)). 
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he recover lucidity.90  The incompetent by definition cannot understand 
the consequences of his silence. 
C.  International Treatment of the Mentally Retarded Capital Defendant 
The United States is the only Western democracy that allows exe-
cution of the mentally disabled.91  While the nations of the European 
Union have eliminated the death penalty altogether,92 and thus do not 
distinguish mentally retarded defendants from other defendants for this 
purpose, the execution of the mentally retarded in the United States does 
raise concerns internationally.  On April 6, 1995, the European Parlia-
ment passed a resolution expressing its “deep shock at the number of ex-
ecutions due to take place in the USA” and particularly, its “distress[] 
that . . . the State of Pennsylvania plans to [put] three men to 
death . . . . . . although two of them . . . . . . are believed to be mentally 
ill.” Although the resolution concluded broadly that “to keep human be-
ings for many years under sentence of death constitutes cruel and inhu-
man punishment,” the potential execution of the mentally disabled clear-
ly has particular resonance for the parliament.93 
In 1999, the UN Commission on Human Rights passed a resolu-
tion94 calling for the abolition of the death penalty, but particularly urg-
ing countries which still use the death penalty, among other conditions, 
                                                          
 90. Id. at 419-20 (Powell, J., concurring).  Interestingly, Powell states that this justification is 
of “slight merit” due to the extensive appellate review offered to death row inmates today, and con-
cludes that “[i]t is thus unlikely indeed that a defendant today could go to his death with knowledge 
of undiscovered trial error that might set him free.”  Id. at 420. 
 91. Human Rights Watch, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and Offenders with Mental 
Retardation, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2002).  
(“The United States may be the only constitutional democracy whose law expressly permits the ex-
ecution of persons whose cognitive development has been limited by mental retardation and that 
carries out such executions.”); Robinson, supra note 3, at 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/execut3.htm (last modified Oct. 24, 2001) (“Japan and South Ko-
rea are the only established democracies in the world, other than the U.S., which still conduct exe-
cutions.”)’; HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE ANTI-DEATH PENALTY 
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1972-94 at 3 (1996) (Among industrialized democracies, Only Japan, 
parts of the former Soviet Union and the United States still carry out death sentences for “ordinary” 
crimes of violence.). 
 92. See Countries that Have Abolished and Retained the Death Penalty, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/internationalreport.html (last visited October 11, 2001).  Indeed, 
more than half of all the countries in the world have now abolished the death penalty, either de jure, 
by legislative or judicial act, or de facto, in that they have not carried out an execution in at least ten 
years.  See Amnesty International, Website Against the Death Penalty: Abolitionist and Retentionist 
Countries at http://www.web.amnesty.org (last modified June 1, 2001). 
 93. Resolution on the Impending Executions in the USA, 1995 OJ C 109 (April 6, 1995). 
 94. U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., 58th Mtg, U.N. Doc. E/SR. 61 (1999) available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch. 
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“[n]ot to impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any form 
of mental disorder or to execute any such person.”95  Once again, the 
mental status of the defendant has particular resonance for the Commis-
sion.96 
It is not clear whether, in addition to those countries which have to-
tally abolished the death penalty, most retentionist countries prohibit the 
application of the death penalty to the mentally retarded.  Although at 
least one commentator reports that “most states of the world prohibit the 
execution of the mentally retarded,”97 the 1985 Capital Punishment Re-
port of the Secretary General of the United Nations only speaks of “men-
tal illness”98 and does not clearly distinguish mental retardation from 
mental illnesses.99  Clearly, though, in permitting the execution of men-
tally retarded capital offenders, the United States is in the distinct minor-
ity of countries.100 
III.  THE PENRY CASE IN THE COURTS 
A.  First trial and appeals 
In 1979, Johnny Paul Penry raped and stabbed Pamela Carpenter.101  
Although Mrs. Carpenter died from her injuries, she was able to provide 
a description of her assailant to the police.102  Local police, believing the 
description to fit Penry, who had recently been paroled on another rape 
conviction,103 asked Penry to accompany them to the police station to 
speak to the investigators in charge of the Carpenter killing.  Penry ini-
tially denied involvement in the killing, but after the police noticed a 
                                                          
 95. Id. at 3(e) (emphasis added). 
 96. Other categories of defendants singled out for mention in the Resolution are juveniles and 
pregnant women Id. at 3(a). 
 97. John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United States Ratifi-
cation of the International Covenant and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59, n.111 and ac-
companying text (1993). 
 98. U.N. Doc. E 1985/43 (April 26, 1985) (“With regard to mental illness, the majority of 
countries reported that this precludes the possible sentencing or execution of capital offenders.”)  
The Report is ambiguous, and may intend to say only that legal “insanity” constitutes a defense to 
criminal responsibility. 
 99. Although a mentally retarded individual may suffer from mental illness, mental retarda-
tion itself is not considered a mental illness.  “DSM-IV, supra note 4, at 39-46.” 
 100. Robinson, supra note 3, at http://www.religioustolerance.org/execut3.htm (last modified 
Oct. 24, 2001) (“[The U.S. is] the only democratic jurisdiction in the world to allow [execution of 
the mentally retarded.]  A very few other countries, all dictatorships, allow this practice.”). 
 101. Penry I, 492 U.S. 302  (1989). 
 102. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 103. Penry v. Texas, 691 S.W.2d 636, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). 
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wound on his back consistent with the scissors used to kill the victim, 
Penry told the police officers “I want to get it off my conscience,” and “I 
done it.”104  Penry later signed more detailed confessions to the crime,105 
and was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.106 
Johnny Paul Penry’s personal history is as disturbing as the crime 
for which he was convicted and sentenced to death.  Penry’s mother suf-
fered from paranoid schizophrenia,107 and during birth, Penry sustained 
injuries due to breech positioning which left him with organic brain 
damage.108  Penry was repeatedly beaten and abused as a child, and 
dropped out of first grade.109  His IQ has been variously estimated at be-
tween 50-60,110 and he has been described as having the “mental age”111 
of a six (6) to seven (7) year old child.112  At the time of his trial and 
sentencing, Penry “could not read or write,113 name the days of the week 
or months of the year, count to one hundred, say how many nickels are 
in a dime, or name the President of the United States.”114 
Although Penry introduced evidence in the guilt phase of his trial 
tending to show his insanity at the time of the crime, the jury rejected 
                                                          
 104. Id. at 645. 
 105. Id. at 641 
 106. Id. 
 107. Human Rights Watch, supra note 93, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-
07.htm. 
 108.  Human Rights Watch, supra note 93, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-07.htm. 
 109.  Human Rights Watch, supra note 93, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-0.htm. 
 110. On a standardized scale which defines 100 as the “Average” IQ.   Human Rights Watch, 
supra note 93, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-01.htm. 
 111. “Mental Age” is a concept that attempts to give context to adults’ mental impairment by 
stating it in the context of childhood developmental stages and capabilities.  MERRIAM WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 726 (10th ed. 1993).  This construct, while providing a convenient way 
to think about adult mental impairment, has been criticized for underestimating the life experiences 
of retarded adults, and underestimating the logical and reasoning capabilities of unimpaired chil-
dren.  Penry I, 492 U.S. at 308, 339 (citing amici brief for American Association on Mental Retar-
dation).  But see Richard C. Dieter, The U.S. Death Penalty and International Law: US Compliance 
with the Torture and Race Conventions, (Nov. 12, 1998) at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DPICstatements.html#torture (“If it is wrong to execute those un-
der age 18 at the time of their crime, it would also be wrong to execute someone whose mental age 
was considerably under 18.”); Coyne & Entzeroth, ’supra note 3, at 46 (“If a child of ten or eleven 
should not be executed under any circumstances, then surely a person who may have a chronologi-
cal age of twenty, but a mental and emotional age of ten or eleven, should not be put to death.”) (ci-
tation omitted). 
 112. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 308. 
 113. Penry’s aunt once spent an entire year trying to teach Penry to write his name.  Id. at 309. 
 114. Human Rights Watch, supra note 93, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ustat/ustat0301-07.htm. 
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that defense and convicted Penry.115  Under Texas law at the time of 
Penry’s first trial, capital cases were conducted in two phases.116  After 
completion of the guilt/innocence phase, the jury reconvened to deter-
mine the sentence to be imposed.  After presentation of evidence rele-
vant to sentencing, the jury was given a set of “special issues” mandated 
by Texas law.117  These “special issues” asked the jury to determine: 
(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the 
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expecta-
tion that the death of the deceased or another would result; 
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society; and 
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in 
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, 
if any, by the deceased.118 
Although Penry introduced evidence at the sentencing phase tend-
ing to show that he was mentally retarded, and thus, bore diminished 
personal culpability for the murder,119 the jury was never instructed that 
it could take this mitigating evidence into account in formulating its re-
sponse to the special issues.120 The special issues themselves contain no 
provision for consideration of mitigating evidence or personal moral 
culpability in determining whether to impose the death penalty, being 
essentially factual inquiries.121  After deliberation, the jury returned an-
swers of “yes” to all the special issue questions, and the court according-
ly122 sentenced Penry to death.123  The Texas Criminal Court of Appeals 
                                                          
 115. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d at 917. 
 116. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 307-08. 
 117. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. Sess. 
2001). 
 118. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. Sess. 
2001). 
 119. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 308-09. 
 120. Id. at 311. 
 121. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 122. The death sentence was mandated by Texas state statute if the jury’s answers to the three 
special issues were affirmative. See TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROC. art. 37.071 (pre-1999)  This 
formal requirement became a basis for the decisions in Penry I and II regarding the need for a 
mechanism by which the jury could express its moral response to the facts of the case.  See note 72 
and accompanying text. 
 123. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 310-11. 
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affirmed the sentence,124 and Penry appealed to the Fifth Circuit.125 
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Penry alleged126 that the Texas capi-
tal sentencing procedure violated his Eighth Amendment right to avoid 
cruel and unusual punishment, since the jury was unable to give effect to 
the evidence regarding Penry’s diminished mental capacity (and dimin-
ished moral responsibility) under the restrictive Texas statutory sentenc-
ing scheme.127  The Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction, but only after 
expressing doubts about the tension between the Supreme Court’s ap-
proval of the Texas state sentencing statute in Jurek v. Texas128 and the 
demands of the Court’s post-Furman death penalty jurisprudence for 
consideration of the individual circumstances of each case.129  The Fifth 
Circuit concluded that “Penry’s conviction is a good example of mitigat-
ing circumstances that pose a problem under the Texas scheme” and that 
“perhaps it is time to reconsider Jurek in light of [] developing law,”130 
but ultimately held that, under Jurek and past Fifth Circuit decisions re-
jecting claims similar to Penry’s,131 it had no choice but to affirm Pen-
ry’s conviction and sentence.132 
B.  Penry I 
Penry appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States 
Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted.133  On appeal, Penry argued 
that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual” punishment134 
prohibited Texas’ attempts to execute a mentally retarded person.  In 
making this argument, Penry relied on Ford v. Wainwright135 to argue 
that the Eighth Amendment prohibited his execution.  The Court applied 
the familiar two-part Eighth Amendment analysis to Penry’s Eighth 
                                                          
 124. Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636 (1985). 
 125. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d at 915. 
 126. Penry actually raised two additional grounds for reversal of the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals, which do not concern us here: 1) Defendant’s confession should have been excluded under 
Miranda rules; 2) One jury member should have been excluded for cause.  Both were resolved 
against Penry.  Id. 
 127. Id. at 916-17 & 919-26. 
 128. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 129. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d at 920-21. 
 130. Id. at 925. 
 131. Id. at 926 (citing Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1986), and Granviel v. Estelle, 
655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1003 (1982). 
 132. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d at 926. 
 133. Penry v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988). 
 134. U.S. CONST., amend. VIII. 
 135. Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see also supra notes 70-92 and accompanying 
text. 
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Amendment claim, as it had to Ford’s claim in 1986.136  First, was the 
punishment considered cruel and unusual in England or the United 
States at the time the Amendment was drafted and ratified for inclusion 
in the Constitution?137  Second, even if the punishment was not consid-
ered cruel and unusual at the time of drafting, have the “evolving stand-
ards of decency” in our society reached the point at which we should 
hold that the punishment has become cruel and unusual?138  However, 
Penry’s case was clearly distinguishable from Ford’s.  Penry’s claim was 
not that he was incompetent to be executed, as that term was defined in 
Ford.139  Penry claimed that the rule in Ford should be extended to the 
mentally retarded as well as the incompetent.140 
The first prong, the historic inquiry, is the basis on which execution 
of the incompetent was prohibited in Ford v . Wainwright.141  In Ford, 
after reviewing the evidence of cases and treatises that civilized society 
has never considered it appropriate to execute the incompetent,142 the 
Court concluded that where a convict  does not understand the nature of 
the punishment or the reasons why it is being inflicted on him, the Con-
stitution prohibits proceeding with the execution.143  In Penry I, in con-
trast, the Court found insufficient evidence that the execution of the 
mentally retarded was considered inappropriate in 18th century English 
or American law and society.144 The Court recognized evidence that “id-
iots” were not subject to conviction and punishment; however, while 
conceding that the label of idiocy bears some resemblance to our modern 
label of mental retardation, the Court limited that label to those whose 
                                                          
 136. Penry I, 492 U.S. 302, 313 & 329-40 (1989). 
 137. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406. 
 138. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), cited in Ford, 477 U.S. at 406. 
 139. In Ford, the Court defined incompetence to be executed as a mental state in which the 
defendant could not understand the nature of the punishment to be inflicted, or why it was to be im-
posed on him.  Ford, 477 U.S. at 417.  Penry was found competent to stand trial, and his insanity 
defense was rejected; events that the Court found dispositive of the issue of whether Penry was “un-
aware of the punishment [he was] about to suffer and why [he was] to suffer it.”  Penry I, 492 U.S. 
at 333, quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).  Presumably, there were no indica-
tions, as in Ford, that Penry’s mental state had deteriorated while in prison, which would have man-
dated a pre-execution hearing as to Penry’s mental capacity to be executed. 
 140. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 328-29 (arguing mentally retarded people do not posses the level of 
moral culpability to justify imposing death). 
 141. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-08 (holding ancient limitations still apply to restrict imposing the 
death penalty on an incompetent prisoner). 
 142. Id. at 408-410. 
 143. Id. at 409-410 (concluding the Eighth Amendment does not allow a death sentence to be 
carried out on an incompetent prisoner). 
 144. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 332-34 (holding “the two statutes prohibiting execution of the men-
tally retarded . . . do[es] not provide sufficient evidence . . . of a national consensus.”) 
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retardation is so profound that they “had a total lack of reason or under-
standing, or an inability to distinguish between good and evil.”145 Such 
defendants would, as the Court notes, already be protected from execu-
tion by Ford v. Wainwright,146 if not from trial and conviction by doc-
trines governing competence to stand trial147 and the insanity defense.148 
Since the Framers arguably did not have the mentally retarded in 
mind when drafting the Eighth Amendment, then, the focus shifts to the 
current state of society; i.e., whether “evolving standards of decency” 
prohibit today what was permissible more than 200 years ago.149  Here, 
also, the Court in Penry I found insufficient evidence of the sort of so-
cietal consensus present in Ford v. Wainwright.  The Court in Penry I 
looked primarily to two forms of evidence in seeking this societal con-
sensus: laws passed by the states’ legislatures and data on the behavior 
of juries in the capital sentencing phase of trials.150  The Court found, in 
contrast to the execution of the mentally incompetent addressed in 
Ford,151 that there were insufficient objective indicia of a societal con-
sensus against executing the mentally retarded.152  Specifically, only one 
State153 which otherwise allowed executions expressly forbade execution 
of the mentally retarded.154  In addition, the federal Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988155 expressly prohibited the execution of the mentally retard-
ed for violation of its provisions.156Although the Court does not provide 
an explicit threshold of what constitutes a “national consensus,” the 
                                                          
 145. Id. at 332.  The diagnostic categories of mental retardation do not help us answer the 
question of whether a defendant could distinguish right from wrong.  See supra note 47 and accom-
panying text. 
 146. Ford, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
 147. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 333 (holding that there is a common law prohibition on punishing the 
incompetent).  See supra notes 28-39. 
 148. Id. at 332-33.  See supra notes 11-26. 
 149. Id. at 333-34. 
 150. Id. at 331 (“The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is 
the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.  We have also looked to data concerning the 
actions of sentencing juries.”) Contra Dupler, supra note 6, at 595 & 599-611 (arguing the Supreme 
Court excluded other reliable evidence when it focused on state legislature outcomes in determining 
whether the death penalty applied to the mentally retarded). 
 151. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405-09 (objective evidence of societal consensus that executing the in-
sane is wrong). 
 152. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 335. 
 153. The Court noted that Maryland had passed such a statute, but that it had not become effec-
tive at the time of the hearing in Penry I.  Id. at 334. 
 154. See GA. CODE ANN. §17-7-131(j) (West, WESTLAW through 2001 Gen. Assem.), cited 
in Penry I, 492 U.S. at 334. 
 155. 102 Stat. 4390 (1988). 
 156. Id. at §7000(1). 
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Court compared the data in Penry I to that in Ford157 and Thompson v. 
Oklahoma.158  The Court concluded that one Federal statute, two express 
state laws, and fourteen states prohibiting capital punishment entirely, 
did not amount to a national consensus as required under the Eighth 
Amendment.159  According to the Court, “the single state statute prohib-
iting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the four-
teen states that have rejected capital punishment completely, does not 
provide sufficient evidence at present of a national consensus.”160 
If the punishment challenged is not “cruel and unusual” by refer-
ence to either the standards of the date of enactment of the Eighth 
Amendment or according to the dictates of a national consensus, the 
Court may still determine that the punishment is unconstitutional if it 
“makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment 
and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition 
of pain and suffering”161 or if it is “grossly out of proportion to the se-
verity of the crime.”162  Although recognizing that “mental retardation is 
a factor that may well lessen a defendant’s culpability for a capital of-
fense,”163 the Court refused to go further and find that mental retardation 
in and of itself necessarily diminishes personal culpability to the degree 
that capital punishment would be impermissibly disproportionate to the 
“personal culpability of the offender.”164  Because of the vast array of 
mental deficiencies that constitute the category of “mental retardation,” 
the Court stated, the better rule is to require consideration of mental re-
tardation as a mitigating factor,165 than to prohibit imposition of capital 
                                                          
 157. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 334 (“No State permitting the execution of the insane, and 26 states 
requiring a stay of execution if a convict became insane.”) 
 158. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).  (National consensus against execution of 
individuals under 16 years of age existed where 18 states expressly established a minimum age of 
16 for death penalty.) 
 159. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 334. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976). 
 162. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, cited in Penry I, 492 U.S. at 335. 
 163. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 340. 
 164. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (“a criminal sentence must be directly related to the per-
sonal culpability of the criminal offender.”). 
 165. But see Michael Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling 
Role of “Mitigating” Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 239 
(1994) (arguing that the mitigating evidence causes jurors to distrust mental disability evidence and 
they are treated more harshly), Upholding Law and Order, HARTSVILLE MESSENGER, June 24, 1997 
at 5B col. 1, cited in Entzeroth, supra note 57 at n.158 (“[t]here is all the more reason to execute a 
killer if he is also insane or retarded . . . . . . an insane or retarded killer is more to be feared than a 
sane or normal killer.”).  This prejudice against the mentally ill and retarded is not a new phenome-
non, having been used by Jeremy Bentham as evidence of the illogic of the death penalty and its 
deterrence justification.  1 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 449-56 (photo 
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punishment upon the mentally retarded altogether.166  Thus, the Court, 
noting that “virtually all” of the states which impose the death penalty 
provide for introduction of evidence of diminished mental capacity as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing,167 held that such a consideration is a 
Constitutional mandate.168  Penry’s case was remanded to the courts of 
Texas for retrial consistent with this mandate. 
C.  Second Trial 
On retrial, Penry was again convicted of the murder of Pamela Car-
penter, and again sentenced to death.169  Because Texas’ statutes govern-
ing the imposition of the death penalty had not changed,170  the sentenc-
ing jury was given the same three special issues the first jury had 
considered.  However, this jury was also provided with supplemental in-
structions designed to comply with the mandate of Penry I that the jury 
be given a vehicle to express its “reasoned moral response” to the 
crime.171  According to the Fifth Circuit, the trial judge directed “the jury 
to consider any other relevant mitigating evidence and explained how to 
give effect to that evidence.”172  The jury was given a “supplemental in-
struction” which stated in relevant part: 
 
                                                          
reprint 1971) (Edinburgh, Tait 1843) (since an insane criminal is more dangerous than a sane one, 
the exemption from execution of the insane is illogical).  See also George Bernard Shaw, Letter, 
THE TIMES, Dec. 5, 1947, at 5 (“Dangerous insanity, instead of exempting [a person] from “liquida-
tion,” should be one of the strongest grounds for it.”), cited in ELIZABETH O. TUTTLE, THE 
CRUSADE AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN 58 (1961). 
 166. Id. at 336-39 (“In light of the diverse capacities and life experiences of mentally retarded 
persons, it cannot be said on the record before is that all mentally retarded people, by definition, can 
never act with the level of culpability associated with the death penalty.”); Contra, Penry I, 492 
U.S. at 344-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are characteristics as to which there is no danger 
of spurious generalization because they are a part of the clinical definition of mental retardation,” 
and those characteristics justify exempting the mentally retarded from the death penalty without 
need of an individualized inquiry). 
 167. Penry I, 472 U.S. at 337 (finding most states list evidence of a defendant’s capacity “to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct” for mitigating circumstance evidence). 
 168. Id. (concluding jury must be provided with “a “vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned moral 
response’ to [the mitigating evidence of Penry’s mental retardation] in rendering its sentencing deci-
sion.”).  Id. at 321, 328 (citation omitted). 
 169. Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 170. Texas did not amend its capital sentencing scheme until 1999, after Penry’s second trial.  
An Act Relating to Jury Instructions and Charges in Capital Cases, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 
ch.140 (Vernon) (effective Sept. 1, 1999) (codified at TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 
(Vernon 2001)). 
 171. Supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 172. Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 507. 
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When you deliberate on the questions posed in the special issues, you 
are to consider mitigating circumstances . . . .  A mitigating circum-
stance may include . . . any aspect of the defendant’s character and 
record or circumstances of the crime which you believe could make a 
death sentence inappropriate in this case.  [Y]ou must decide how 
much weight they deserve, if any, and give effect and consideration to 
them in assessing the defendant’s personal culpability at the time you 
answer the special issue.  If you determine, when giving effect to the 
mitigating evidence, if any, that a life sentence, as reflected by a nega-
tive finding to the issue under consideration, rather than a death sen-
tence, is an appropriate response to the personal culpability of the de-
fendant, a negative finding should be given to one of the special 
issues.173 
This supplemental instruction was approved by the Fifth Circuit, 
and Penry again appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiora-
ri.174 
D.  Penry II 
Justice O’Connor once again wrote the majority opinion in Penry 
II.  With respect to the supplemental jury instruction, O’Connor clarified 
that the critical question was not whether the jury instructions made 
“mere mention of ‘mitigating circumstances[,]’”175 but that the jury must 
have an opportunity to “consider and give effect to a defendant’s miti-
gating evidence in imposing sentence.”176  O’Connor recognized that 
although the instruction does instruct the jury to consider the mitigating 
evidence introduced at the sentencing phase by Penry, it does not allow 
the jury to respond to that evidence in any way other than through the 
existing set of special issues.  The jury is instructed that if it finds Pen-
ry’s mental retardation evidence persuasive that he does not deserve the 
death penalty, that it is to respond negatively to one of the special issues.  
But which one?  What if the state’s evidence is persuasive on each of the 
facts identified by the special issues: that Penry intended death to result 
                                                          
 173. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).  Perhaps the Texas court and Fifth Circuit were persuaded 
that the Supreme Court had backed off of the Penry I suggestion that the jury must be able to con-
sider all relevant mitigating evidence because the Supreme Court, in several post-Penry I cases, had 
distinguished other types of mitigating evidence.  Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993) (rec-
ognizing youth as mitigating evidence); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (allowing 
youth, unstable family background, and positive character traits), cited in Penry, 215 F.3d at 515 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 174. Penry v. Johnson, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000). 
 175. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) [hereinafter Penry II]. 
 176. Id., quoting Penry I, 429 U.S. at 319 (1989). 
23
Hall: Penry v. Johnson
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
HALL1.DOC 1/22/2021  3:52 PM 
350 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3/4 
from his actions, that he is likely to be dangerous in the future if re-
leased, and that his actions were not a reasonable response to any provo-
cation offered by the victim?  The jury must question whether it is being 
expected to falsify its responses to the special issues, and may still justi-
fiably believe that it has no legal and moral option other than to answer 
the factual questions posed in a truthful manner.  Indeed, this dilemma is 
exacerbated by the highlighted portion of the jury instruction beginning 
“as reflected by.”  This clause, when read in light of the entire instruc-
tion, appears to suggest that the only mitigating evidence which is rele-
vant to the jury’s determination is evidence which sheds light on the 
proper response to the factual questions asked by the special issues.177  
In order to spare a capital defendant, then, the jury must overcome the 
implied limitation of the “as reflected by” clause and agree to falsify one 
or more of the special issues in response to mental status evidence intro-
duced by the defendant at the sentencing phase.  Thus, the jury may be 
forced into a knowing lie if it believes that, notwithstanding Penry’s 
likely future dangerousness, the lack of provocation and his expectation 
that death would result from his crime, his mental disability makes the 
death penalty undesirable.178 
Assuming, arguendo, that the three questions mandated by then-
Texas law should, according to a reasonable view of the evidence, be an-
swered in the affirmative, the Texas response to Penry I was thus to in-
vite the jurors to commit to a knowing falsehood, if they wished to spare 
Penry’s life due to a lack of moral blameworthiness generated by his 
mental retardation.  The next Section will examine the historic use of 
such knowing falsehoods, referred to as “legal fictions,” in capital pun-
ishment law, and the relevance of this history for Penry and the Supreme 
Court in 2001. 
IV.  LEGAL FICTIONS AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
In English law, fiction is a syphilis, which runs in every vein, and 
carries into every part of the system the principle of rottenness.179   
                                                          
 177. Cf. Penry v. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 514 (Dennis, Circuit Justice, dissenting).  In this, Justice 
Thomas’ dissenting remark in Penry II that he does not see how the jury instruction could be made 
confusing is disingenuous at best, since the instruction cited is patently inconsistent with the instruc-
tion to consider  “any aspect of . . . the crime which . . . could make a death sentence inappropriate.” 
 178. See Penry II, 532 U.S. 782.  (“The mechanism created by the supplemental instruction 
thus inserted ‘an element of capriciousness’ into the sentencing decision, ‘making the jurors’ power 
to avoid the death penalty dependent on their willingness’ to elevate the supplemental instruction 
over the verdict form instructions.”) (citations omitted). 
 179. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL 
JURIES, PARTICULARLY IN CASES OF LIBEL LAW (photo. reprint 1978) (London, Effingham Wilson 
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A frequent and pervasive resort to fiction marks, then, those subjects 
where the urge toward systematic structure is strong and insistent.180 
A.  Legal Fictions and the Death Penalty 
Although there has been substantial debate about the proper defini-
tion of the term “legal fiction,” and many definitions propounded,181 we 
shall use a definition proposed by Lon Fuller in1930-31.182  Fuller de-
fined a legal fiction as “[e]ither (1) a statement propounded with a com-
plete or partial awareness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recog-
nized as having utility.”183 Fuller distinguished a fiction from a lie by the 
fact that the fiction is not intended to deceive,184 and from a simple erro-
neous conclusion by the fact that the speaker of the fiction, unlike the 
speaker of an erroneous conclusion, is conscious of the falsity of his ut-
terance.185  The consciously false utterance of the legal fiction has utility 
because it enables the law to do which previously could not be done, 
without requiring changes to the positive black-letter law.186 
Jury resort to legal fictions to avoid the harsh effects of overly for-
malistic death penalty laws is not a new phenomenon.187  English juries, 
during the period in English history when death sentences were manda-
tory for many crimes (mandatory sentencing being the most dramatic 
form of restricted jury discretion), were nonetheless able to avoid appli-
cation of the death penalty through fact-finding fictions designed to take 
crimes out of the mandatory classifications.188 
                                                          
1821). 
 180. LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS xi (1967). 
 181. See generally Louise Harmon, Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of 
Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 2-16 (1990) (reviewing the history of uses of legal fictions). 
 182. FULLER, supra note 180.  (This book is a reprint of three  articles on legal fictions pub-
lished in 1930-31 in the Illinois Law Review.).  First published in 1931, Fuller’s treatment of the 
legal fiction stands at the end of the “second wave” of scholarly interest in the legal fiction de-
scribed by Professor Harmon in Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted 
Judgment.  Harmon, supra note 181 at 11-16.  It is perhaps the most significant extended work on 
this topic. 
 183. FULLER, supra note 180, at 9. 
 184. Id. at 6. 
 185. Id. at 7. 
 186. Id. at 62-63. 
 187. Id. at 53 (“Generally, a fiction is intended to escape the consequences of an existing, spe-
cific rule of law.”)  For a discussion of the conservative nature of legal fictions in insulating the pos-
itive law from forces of change, see Harmon, supra note 181, at 7-8 (1990).  See also Henry S. 
Maine, Ancient Works, in THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 356, 371 (L. Fuller ed., 1949) (“The 
fact is . . . that the law has been wholly changed; the fiction is that it remains what it always was.”). 
 188. WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 33 (1979) (noting that “all felonies except 
petty larceny and mayhem carried the death penalty”). 
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Although the death penalty was increasingly limited and circum-
scribed in England throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries,189 and finally eliminated entirely in 1969,190 much of English legal 
history is characterized by an inflexible black letter approach to the 
death penalty.  Beginning in the thirteenth century, death was the fixed 
punishment for murder and virtually all felony crimes, regardless of their 
severity or frequency.191  Because of this “excessive uniformity,”192 and 
the lack of proportionality between crime and sentence at common law, 
the legal culture of the time developed means of mitigating the severity 
of the common law.  Baker193 describes four devices for such mitiga-
tion,194 two of which deserve consideration here. 
1.  Benefit of Clergy 
The Benefit of Clergy rule arose from the historic division in Eng-
lish law between royal and ecclesiastical court systems.  Under the rule 
developed at the Council of Clarendon in 1164, clergy accused of crimes 
were to be tried by canon law, rather than common law, courts.195  If 
convicted in the ecclesiastical court, the clergyman would be stripped of 
his clerical rank and returned to the common law courts for punish-
ment.196  After the death of Thomas Becket, who had argued that this 
rule constituted unacceptable double punishment,197 in 1170, the Church 
argued for and won an expansion of the privilege to the extent that capi-
tal charges against clergymen would be handled exclusively by the ec-
clesiastical court system,198 in which the punishment of death was not 
available.199  During the thirteenth century, this rule was applied rela-
tively strictly, and a defendant’s claim of benefit of clergy in a capital 
case would be denied if he did not meet prevailing standards of clerical 
                                                          
 189. See generally TUTTLE, supra note 165. 
 190. HAINES, supra note 91, at 13. 
 191. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 584 (3d. ed. 1990) (noting 
that in the thirteenth century the King’s discretion over the person for felony convicts gave way to 
fixed death sentences). 
 192. Id. 
 193. BAKER, supra note 191. 
 194. Id. at 584-86 (sanctuary, benefit of clergy, pardons and jury mitigation). 
 195. Id. at 148. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Steven L. Kessler, Crime and Punishment . . . and Punishment: Civil Forfeiture and the 
Double Jeopardy Clause (May 25, 1996) at http://www.kessleronforfeiture.com/crime.html (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2001) (discussing the history of the double jeopardy clause and its current applica-
tions). 
 198. BAKER, supra note 194, at 148. 
 199. BERNS, supra note 191, at 33. 
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dress, appearance or education (literacy).200  However, during the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries, the benefit of clergy rule was greatly ex-
panded into a device for routinely mitigating the mandatory death sen-
tences of the common law. Literacy supplanted dress or appearance as 
the test of clerical status,201 and often the text given to prisoners to read 
was standardized and generally known in advance,202 so that “with a lit-
tle preparation anyone of intelligence could save his life.”203 This prac-
tice was thus expanded, by means of a convenient fiction, to laymen204 
as well as clerics, in order to “moderate the common law’s excessively 
sanguinary schedule of punishments.”205 
2.  Jury mitigation 
Ever since a jury of one’s peers has been the means for adjudicating 
guilt or innocence,206 there has existed the theoretical possibility that a 
jury might ignore the black letter law (as articulated by the court), and 
acquit in cases where the jury members believe conviction to be immor-
al, regardless of the facts adduced at trial.  In the eighteenth century, the 
death penalty was applied to more than two hundred crimes207 ranging 
from murder and treason to theft of property valued at more than forty 
shillings.208  In order to avoid the death penalty, juries would often use 
their fact-finding power to remove the crime in question from the class 
punishable by death to a lesser classification.  For example, many juries 
                                                          
 200. BAKER, supra note 194, at 586-87. 
 201. Stephen Greenblatt, Benefit of Clergy, Benefit of Literature, 6.1 Stanford Humanities Re-
view (1995), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/6-1/html/greenblatt.html.  
 202. BAKER, supra note 191, at 587.  Eventually, even the pretense of literacy testing was 
abandoned, allowing defendants to claim benefit of clergy without the need to demonstrate literacy 
in even a summary fashion.  Id. at 588. 
 203. Id. at 587. 
 204. BERNS, supra note 188, at 33.  See also JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW OF ENGLAND (London MacMillan 1883)(outlining a history of capital punishment and the 
benefit of clergy expanded to laymen).  Although women, who could not be ordained as priests, 
could not claim benefit of clergy in capital cases, the fiction not extending so far, women could 
claim pregnancy to escape capital punishment.  BAKER, supra note 191, at 587.  By one account, 
more than a third of women convicts used pregnancy as a means to avoid the death penalty; leading 
to some question whether pregnancy was not used in a fictional sense as well.  Id. at 587 n.68. 
 205. BERNS, supra note 188, at 33, citing Stephen, supra note 204 at 458-78. 
 206. In Bushell’s Case, the House of Lords held that a juror may not be punished for a verdict 
in the face of the evidence, thus establishing the jury’s power, if not right, to nullify the law.  Bush-
ell’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670). 
 207. TUTTLE, supra note 165. 
 208. 1 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750 95 (1948).  Stealing 40s from a residence was made nonclergiable in 
1713.  BAKER, supra note 191, at 591 n.84, citing RADZINOWICZ, supra. 
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found property stolen to be valued at thirty-nine shillings, just short of 
the amount which would have condemned the defendant to death.209  
That it was the perceived injustice of the death penalty in such cases, ra-
ther than the precise valuation involved, is shown by the allegation made 
in Parliament that when the valuation deserving of the death penalty was 
raised from forty shillings to five pounds, the juries raised their verdicts 
from thirty- nine shillings to four pounds, nineteen shillings; again, just 
less than the amount needed to convict of the capital crime.210 
The results of jurors’ use of this legal fiction to avoid the death 
penalty was predictable.  Since the law of the time provided no criminal 
sanction for these actions other than death, it became nearly impossible 
to obtain convictions on charges of theft.  In 1808, a group of merchants 
in England and Ireland signed a petition demanding the abolition of the 
death penalty for theft from their premises, on the grounds that, since it 
was impossible to obtain convictions due to the perceived harshness of 
the death penalty in such circumstances, theft had increased intolera-
bly.211  Savvy criminals demanded to be tried under the capital statute 
because they knew that, due to jurors’ reluctance to convict, they stood a 
greater chance of acquittal.212 
Other legal fictions to avoid the death penalty were also used, not 
always by juries.  For example, in 1922, the English Infanticide Act de-
fined the death of a “newly born” child as manslaughter rather than mur-
der, so as to avoid the application of the death penalty.  In 1938, the term 
“newly born” was expanded further to include all children under twelve 
(12) months of age, greatly diminishing the applicability of the death 
penalty for infanticide.213 
 
B.  Justice Thomas and the Analogy to Jury Nullification 
The Texas courts’ legal fiction response to Penry I is not the only 
                                                          
 209. BERNS, supra note 188, at 33 (“many a jury solemnly and shamelessly set a value of thir-
ty-nine shillings on property worth much more.”). 
 210.  20 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1833) 277-82, cited in TUTTLE, supra note 165, at 9. 
 211. TUTTLE, supra note 165, at 4. 
 212. Id. at 11.  See also 234 PARL. DEB. (3d ser.) (1877) 1671-73, 1676. (death penalty often 
leads to the guilty escaping punishment for murder or being judged insane contrary to the facts of 
the case).  See also North Carolina Commission Report of the Special Commission for the Im-
provement of the Administration of Justice, North Carolina Popular Government 13 (1949), cited in 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976) NORTH CAROLINA COMMISSION FOR THE 
INPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE 
IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1948). 
 213. TUTTLE, supra note 165 at 28. 
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legal fiction prevalent in American criminal law.  In recent years, legal 
commentators have paid much attention to the role of “jury nullification” 
in criminal cases.214  Put simply, jury nullification exists whenever a ju-
ry, presented with evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction, nonethe-
less returns a “Not Guilty” verdict.  Jury nullification is a necessary fea-
ture of any criminal justice system with a commitment to non-
appealability of acquittals and a strong jury system, and as such has been 
a feature of Anglo-American criminal law for centuries.  From early 
English cases to the Fugitive Slave Act cases of the American Recon-
struction period and the Volstead Act cases of Prohibition,215 to the rela-
tively recent acquittal of football player O.J. Simpson of the murder of 
his ex-wife and her companion,216 instances of jury nullification run 
through the entire history of Anglo-American criminal law.217  Although 
jury nullification has often been decried by commentators as an evil, if 
perhaps a necessary evil, in the criminal justice system,218 a few recent 
commentators have embraced the reality of jury nullification, arguing 
that the possibility of jury nullification plays an essential part in the ju-
ry’s role as moral arbiters of the community,219 and in one case actually 
                                                          
 214. David A. Pepper, Nullifying History: Modern-Day Misuse of the Right to Decide the Law, 
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599 (2000) (discussing jury’s right to nullify). 
 215. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (holding the Eighteenth Amendment was 
lawfully proposed and ratified and therefore must be respected). 
 216. For an overview of the history of prominent instances of jury nullification, see Aaron T. 
Oliver, Jury Nullification: Should the Type of Case Matter?, 6 KANSAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 49 
(1997) (discussing jury nullification on historical and current through 1996 cases). 
 217. It should be noted here that any allegations of jury nullification must remain mere allega-
tions as long as the actual deliberations of juries are not available for dissection by academics and 
other commentators.  Although the cases mentioned are among those often cited as examples of jury 
nullification, and are often so perceived in the public mind, there is really no way of knowing what 
prompted a jury’s acquittal in any given specific circumstances. 
 218. See, e.g., Robert E. Korrach & Michael J. Davidson, Jury Nullification: A Call for Justice 
or an Invitation to Anarchy, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131 (1993) (arguing that a court should inform the 
jury “of its power to acquit the accused when the members cannot in good conscience support a 
guilty verdict), United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that “the 
pages of history shine on instances of the jury’s exercise of its prerogative to disregard uncontra-
dicted evidence and the instructions of the judge,” while refusing to give a nullification instruction 
in the trial of the “D.C. Nine”). 
 219. See, e.g., David N. Dorfman & Chris K Iijima, Fictions, Fault and Forgiveness: Jury Nul-
lification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861 (1995) (arguing jury nullification is cor-
rectly used to stop application of a law that would be unjust to a particular defendant); Oliver, supra 
note 216, at 49 (1997) (arguing jury nullification is “a mechanism by which a jury refuses to apply 
the law in situations where strict application of the law could lead to an unjust or inequitable re-
sult.”); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philosopher’s Stone: Dualist Democracy and the Jury, 69 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 175, 179 (1998) (believing juries act as “signalers” of constitutional changes); Kris-
ten K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury about Mandatory Sentencing Conse-
quences, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1233 (1995) (“[The] criminal jury, through its nullification 
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calling for education of jurors in minority communities about their po-
tential role in resisting, through active jury nullification, the increasing 
trends toward disproportionate incarceration of African-American men 
in the United States.220  Other voices calling for a more active role for 
jury nullification in criminal law come from the opposite end of the po-
litical spectrum, including the right-wing militia movement.221 
Jury nullification exists when juries ignore evidence presented to 
them and reach a verdict contrary to that evidence, which verdict cannot 
then be set aside due to the Constitutional prohibition on double jeop-
ardy.222  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Texas, in reviewing 
Penry’s second death sentence in 1995, referred to the trial judge’s in-
struction that if the jury found,  
when giving effect to the mitigating evidence, if any, that a life sen-
tence, as reflected by a negative finding to the issue under considera-
tion, rather than a death sentence, is an appropriate response to the per-
sonal culpability of the defendant223  
that the jury should then answer one of the special issues in the 
negative,224 as a “nullification instruction.”225  In so describing the trial 
court’s instruction, the appellate court appears to be recognizing that, in 
order to give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry’s mental retarda-
tion, organic brain damage and child abuse, the jury would have to dis-
regard the objectively “true” answer to one of the three special ques-
tions, and willfully give a false answer to that question.226 
                                                          
power, is intended to function . . . . . . as a political check on the government’s power to promulgate 
unpopular laws and overly harsh punishments.”) 
 220. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 105 YALE L. J. 677 (1995) (arguing that the doctrine of jury nullification allows African-
Americans to decide what kind of conduct by African-Americans should be punished under the 
white-controlled criminal justice system); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 253, 305-06 (1996) (arguing some juries use nullification to acquit based on improper con-
siderations such as race), W. William Hodes, Reform: The Lawyers: Lord Brougham, The Dream 
Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1975 (1996) (arguing that 
coaxing a jury nullification can be a tactical defense weapon). 
 221. Jury nullification also played a role in the civil rights movement, when all-white Southern 
juries systematically refused to convict white defendants of the crime of murdering Black victims.  
Butler, supra note 226, at 705. 
 222. Leipold, supra note 220, at 1 (“The crucial feature of nullification is the jurors’ decision 
to acquit even though they believe the defendant committed acts that met the statutory definition of 
the crime.”).  Most civil cases cannot be the subject of effective jury nullification, then, because of 
the court’s power to order a judgment as a matter of law.  FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
 223. Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 765 (1995). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Assuming, arguendo, that the “true” answer to all three special questions is in the affirma-
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Justice Thomas’ dissent in Penry II227 indicates that Thomas is sat-
isfied with the constitutionality of the jury instruction given in the sec-
ond trial.228  Thomas believes that this instruction is adequate because it 
meets the mandate of Penry I that jurors be given an opportunity to give 
mitigating effect to Penry’s evidence of mental retardation and organic 
brain damage229  Thomas argues that the applicable standard under Pen-
ry I is “whether a reasonable juror could have believed that there was no 
vehicle for expressing the view that Penry did not deserve to be sen-
tenced to death based upon his mitigating evidence.”230  Thomas, quot-
ing the appellate court’s opinion, refers to the jury instruction in Penry’s 
second trial as a “nullification instruction,”231 apparently conceding that, 
in order to give effect to a juror’s “view that Penry did not deserve” a 
death sentence, that juror would have to “nullify” the answer to at least 
one of the three Texas statutory special issues.232Thomas’ reasoning is 
surprising given the fact that the Supreme Court has never expressly ap-
proved of a jury instruction that instructed a juror that she possessed the 
power to return a verdict contrary to her objective view of the facts of 
the case.233  Nullification instructions are in fact routinely denied in state 
and federal courts234 despite the best efforts of some activists to intro-
                                                          
tive; that is, that Penry acted deliberately with the reasonable expectation of killing his victim; that 
does pose a continuing threat to society, and that his actions were not a reasonable response to any 
provocation offered by the victim. 
 227. See Penry II (joined by Justices Scalia and Rehnquist). 
 228. Penry II, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2001). 
 229. Id. at 1925 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id., quoting Penry I, 492 U.S. 30, 326 (1989). 
 231. Penry II, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S. Ct. at 1931. 
 232. That is, the juror would have to answer one of the question “no,” despite a reasonable and 
objective belief that the answer was, in fact, “yes.” 
 233. Cf. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, (1895) (although criminal juries have the power to 
nullify the law, there is not positive right to nullify) (generally cited as the basis for the virtually 
universal rule that jury nullification instructions are not to be given in criminal cases.) 
 234. See United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 947-48 (1997) (refusal of instruction requir-
ing jury to decide stipulated elements of offense; “jury nullification, while it is available to a de-
fendant, is only a power that the jury has and not a ‘right’ belonging to the defendant[.]”); Thomas 
v. Clark, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3983, *10 (N. D. Calif. 2000)(rejection of a “constitutional right to 
have the jury informed of the penal consequences of its verdict or its prerogative to exercise jury 
nullification.”; jury nullification “is by no means a right or something that a judge should encour-
age[.]”); United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding defendant did not have a 
right to a jury nullification instruction); United States v. Powell, 955 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding federal defendants are not entitled to a jury nullification instruction); United States v. 
Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the 
jury that it had the power to acquit the defendant regardless  of the evidence of his guilt); United 
States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1426 (D. Kan. 1995) (“the court should not encourage the ju-
rors to violate their oath by refusing to apply the law”); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 
1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The existence of an unreviewable and unreversible power in the jury to 
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duce legislation that would mandate jury instructions informing jurors of 
this power.235  Indeed, courts have removed jurors on the grounds that 
the juror intended to engage in nullification.236 
Mirroring the near-universal rejection of jury nullification instruc-
tions by courts is an attitude by commentators and scholars which is, at 
best, highly skeptical of jury nullification instructions.  Commentators 
frequently decry the “anarchy” that would result if jurors were expressly 
authorized to disregard the black letter law in rendering their verdicts,237 
even while expressing admiration for those jurors in the past who have 
defied the positive law in cases of conscience.  In fact, the holdout juror 
is a staple of popular mythology and imagery of the judicial process.238  
Thomas’ opinion, joined by Scalia and Rehnquist, does not explicitly 
address the inconsistencies between the “nullification instruction” in 
Penry II and the rejection of nullification instructions in other contexts, 
raised by his offhand approval of the Texas appellate court’s characteri-
zation of the jury instruction as a “nullification instruction,” but the is-
sues remain.  Does this mean that three Justices are ready to allow nulli-
fication instructions in criminal trials?  This literal reading of the 
dissenting opinion is highly unlikely.  What, therefore, was the intent of 
the dissenting Justices in explicitly approving of an instruction requiring 
                                                          
acquit . . . has for many years co-existed with the legal practice . . . upholding instructions to the 
jury that they are required to follow the instructions of the court on all matters of law.”); contra Id. 
at 114, (Bazelon , J., dissenting) (“On remand the trial judge should grant defendants’ request for a 
nullification instruction.”); United States v. Edwards, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 38757, *7 
(1996)(“While juries have the power to ignore the law in their verdicts, courts have no obligation to 
tell them they may do so.”); United States v. Hardy, 46 M.J. 67 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (“ holding the fact 
that a jury has the power to nullify does not equate to a legal right.”); People v. Cline, 60 Cal. App. 
4th 1327, 1335 (1998) (“Because juries have no right to disregard the court’s instructions, it is inap-
propriate to instruct juries on their power to nullify.”); State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921, 924 (Iowa 
1974) (“It is one thing to recognize jurors have the power not to do their duty and quite another to 
tell them they have a right not to do their duty.”); State v. Bjerkaas, 472 N.W.2d 615 (Wis. 1991) 
(holding juries have the power of nullification but nullification is not a defendant’s right); State v. 
Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361, 1373 (N.J. 1986) ([W]e believe that the last thing a jury needs is a remind-
er of its ability to let the guilty go free); State v. Maloney, 490 A.2d 772, 775 (N.H. 1985) (holding 
that jury nullification is not a right of the defendant). 
 235. Compare grassroots, generally right-wing efforts to pass informed jury acts requiring such 
notification.  Contra Indiana and Maryland, whose state constitutions permit the jury to decide the 
law as well as the facts.  Even in those states, however, explicit jury nullification instructions are not 
given.  Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back Into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 359 (1994). 
 236. Elizabeth Haynes, Note, United States v. Thomas: Pulling the Jury Apart, 30 CONN. L. 
REV. 73 (1998) (noting the Court held “that a juror may be removed only where the juror was en-
gaged in deliberate misconduct”). 
 237. Korrach & Davidson, supra note 224 (arguing without proper instruction, the court is 
open to anarchy); Leipold, supra note 220 (costs of jury nullification outweigh benefits.) 
 238. TWELVE ANGRY MEN (1957); MARK SALZMAN, THE SOLOIST (1994). 
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the use of a form of nullification of the positive law? 
Jury nullification is a form of legal fiction, although it is a fiction 
engaged in on a case—by-case basis by jurors rather than on a sytematic 
basis by courts.  Jury nullification can take the form of general verdicts 
of “not guilty” in the teeth of the evidence.239 In cases where special 
verdicts are required of juries, a jury may nonetheless nullify the law by 
arriving at answers to those special issues which are apparently not sup-
ported by the objective facts.  This is the sort of jury nullification Thom-
as apparently argues for in his dissent.  It is enough, the argument goes, 
that the jury has a safety valve for its distaste at application of the death 
penalty to a mentally retarded offender.  This approach is flawed be-
cause it does not provide the juror with a legitimate avenue for exercise 
of her moral voice, as required by Supreme Court precedent.  The exer-
cise of jury nullification is generally seen as an extraordinary remedy for 
police or prosecutorial misconduct or for unjust application of the law. 
C.  The Argument Against Legal Fiction in Capital Sentencing 
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Penry II focuses on the clash be-
tween the jury instructions mandated by Texas state law, which required 
the jury to determine as a matter of fact whether the defendant (1) acted 
deliberately; (2) remains a threat to society; and (3) acted unreasonably 
in response to any provocation from the victim,240 and the jury instruc-
tions arguably mandated by Penry I, which require the jury to take into 
account the mitigating evidence offered by the defense (here, evidence 
of Penry’s profound mental retardation) which does not fit into any of 
the three statutorily-mandated categories.  The argument is that a juror 
could reasonably find that Penry does not deserve to die (i.e., does not 
bear moral responsibility for the crime, for any of the reasons articulated 
in the history section), while still finding as a matter of fact that the an-
swers to all three of the special issue questions are “yes.”  The juror then 
suffers from a dilemma: Does she answer the special issues truthfully, 
and apply the death penalty in a manner in which society has for centu-
ries agreed is meaningless or worse; or does she give effect to her moral 
judgment by answering a specific factual question untruthfully, thus ar-
guably subverting the purpose of the jury system.  O’Connor’s opinion 
refuses to allow Texas to force the jury into an inconvenient fiction (of 
                                                          
 239. In the case of the general verdict, of course, it is impossible to look into the “black box” 
and know what truly motivated the jury to acquit; that is, to draw the line between honest reasonable 
doubt and intent to nullify the law. 
 240. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text. 
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nondangerousness, or of reasonable provocation) in order to give effect 
to the societal distaste for execution of the mentally retarded.241  
O’Connor’s opinion requires a certain level of legal realism; that is, a 
concern for what juries are actually thinking, to be expressed in the jury 
verdict.  In Fuller’s terms, O’Connor has rejected242 the legal fiction that 
the mentally retarded capital defendant is not dangerous, or not likely to 
commit crimes in the future, or acted with reasonable provocation. 
V.  CONSTITUTIONAL SUFFICIENCY POST-PENRY II 
A.  Requirements of Penry II 
Post-Penry II, is there anything more in the substantive law than af-
ter Penry I? Given that Texas had amended its death penalty statute even 
before Penry II was decided,243 the new Texas statute would probably 
pass muster before a Supreme Court that is unwilling to draw a bright 
line against execution of the mentally retarded.  The requirements under 
current death penalty jurisprudence post-Penry II, then, seem to be that: 
(1)  Juries must be given guidance and objective standards about 
how to apply the law to death penalty defendants, in order to reduce the 
level of irrational bias and prejudice in death penalty cases.  A jury can-
not be, as juries historically were, a “black box” with no guidance or 
predictability. 
(2)  Juries cannot be denied the opportunity to express their rea-
soned moral response to the case as a whole, apart from the statutory cri-
teria set forth in state-mandated jury instructions and special issues.  A 
jury must have the opportunity to assess the case in a holistic manner, 
and may not be circumscribed with blinders that allow it to focus only 
on a fixed set of objectively determinable issues. 
(3)  Juries cannot be required to falsify their judgment as to objec-
                                                          
 241. As further evidence of this societal distaste, note that even in Texas, when Gov. Rick Per-
ry refused to sign a bill which would have allowed judges to determine mental retardation, and thus 
ineligibility for the death penalty, he did so not on the grounds that execution of the mentally retard-
ed is justifiable, but on the grounds that the determination of mental retardation is the proper pur-
view of the jury under Texas’ current statutory scheme (for explication of that scheme, see notes 
117-32 and accompanying text). 
 242. Fuller distinguished between rejection of a legal fiction, which occurs when the fictional 
statement is eliminated from the legal process; and redefinition, which occurs when the meaning of 
the words used in the formulation of the fiction is changed to remove the element of falsity from the 
statement. LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTION 20-21 (1967). 
 243. An Act Relating to Jury Instructions and Changes in Capital Cases, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law 
Serv. ch.140 (Vernon) (effective Sept. 1, 1999) (codified at TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE. ANN. § 37.071 
(Vernon 2001)). 
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tively determinable issues in order to express their reasoned moral re-
sponse to the case and to the defendant.  The Texas system’s failure in 
Penry II was that, in order to allow the defendant to escape the death 
penalty, the jurors would have had to answer one of the special issues 
untruthfully.  It is not sufficient that the jurors receive what Thomas 
called a “nullification instruction” - that they know that falsification of 
one or more of the special issues will result in the defendant’s being sen-
tenced to prison rather than death. 
The issue then becomes how a state balances the holistic, reasoned 
moral response required by Penry II with the guided discretion required 
by Furman and its progeny.  Clearly, a statute which left the imposition 
of the death penalty to the unfettered discretion of the jurors would not 
be acceptable to the Court.  The Court does seem to be saying, however, 
that as to the defendant’s mitigating circumstances, the jury’s fetters 
must be significantly loosened, if not cast off altogether.  The jury must 
have the opportunity to find that the mitigating circumstances offered by 
the defendant justify the rejection of the death penalty, regardless of the 
fact that the special issue questions must, as a matter of fact and evi-
dence, be answered in a way that points to the death penalty.  This is a 
rejection of formalism in death penalty jurisprudence, and it is a rejec-
tion of the legal fiction that is the refuge of formalism (i.e., the legal fic-
tion is a convenient device to allow just results in particular cases with-
out the appearance of change in the law). 
B.  Texas response to Penry 
Texas law has changed since Penry’s second trial.  Current Texas 
law has dispensed with the three statutory “special issues”244 in favor of 
a two-tier jury determination system.  Under this system, a jury in the 
sentencing phase of a capital trial must first, after submission of all evi-
dence, including mitigating evidence,245 determine: 
 
(1) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit 
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to 
society; and 
                                                          
 244. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. 
 245. Evidence “as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, including evidence 
of the defendant’s background or character or the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against 
the imposition of the death penalty” may be admitted at the sentencing phase.  TEX. CRIM. PROC. 
CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(a) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. Sess. 2001). 
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(2) in cases in which [the defendant is found guilty as an “accom-
plice”], whether the defendant actually caused the death of the de-
ceased or did not actually cause the death of the deceased but intended 
to kill the deceased or another or anticipated that a human life would 
be taken.246 
A jury may return an answer of “yes” only if unanimous, and may 
return an answer of “no” only if ten (10) or more jurors agree.247  If the 
jury answers both issues “yes,” the jury must then proceed to consider 
“whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the cir-
cumstances of the offense, the defendant’s character and background, 
and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient 
mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of 
life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed.”248  In mak-
ing this determination, the jury may only return an answer of “yes” if ten 
or more jurors agree.249  If the jury returns a verdict of “yes” on the first 
two issues, and “no” on the third, the court must sentence the defendant 
to death.250  Any other jury determination results in a sentence of life 
imprisonment.251 
Under current Texas law, then, jurors have at least two post-
conviction chances to take into account the mental state of an offender in 
determining whether to impose the death penalty.  They might determine 
that, due to an offender’s diminished mental capacity, he will in all 
probability not constitute a danger to society in the future, and answer 
the first issue “no.”  This possibility is left open by the fact that the stat-
ute expressly requires the court to charge the jury to take into account all 
evidence, including evidence as to the background and character of the 
defendant.252  Notwithstanding the instruction to take account of the de-
                                                          
 246. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. Sess. 
2001).  A jury must be charged that in determining the answers to these questions, it “shall consider 
all evidence admitted at the guilt or innocence stage and the punishment stage, including evidence 
of the defendant’s background or character or the circumstances of the offense that militates for or 
mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty.”   TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 
2(d)(1) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. Sess. 2001) 
 247.  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(d)(2) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. 
Sess. 2001) 
 248.  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(e)(1) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. 
Sess. 2001) 
 249.  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(f) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. 
Sess. 2001) 
 250.  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(g) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. 
Sess. 2001) 
 251.  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(g) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. 
Sess. 2001) 
 252.  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(d)(1) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. 
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fendant’s background and character,253 this remains a factual question, 
and surely would not alone pass Constitutional muster under Penry II.  
The jury has not yet had an opportunity to express its “reasoned moral 
response” to the defendant.254 
If the jury finds that the defendant is likely to be a threat to the 
community in the future, the jury nonetheless has a second opportunity 
to spare the defendant’s life.  The jury must now determine whether 
there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant the imposition of 
a life sentence rather than the death penalty. In making this determina-
tion, the jury is to consider not only “the circumstances of the offense, 
[and] the defendant’s character and background”255 but also the “person-
al moral culpability” of the defendant.256  Strengthening the emphasis on 
moral culpability, the court must instruct the jury that for purposes of 
this question, “mitigating evidence [shall] be evidence that a juror might 
regard as reducing the defendant’s moral blameworthiness.”257  Further, 
as with the first issue, jurors need not agree on the particular evidence 
justifying a “yes” answer to the moral culpability question. 
Taken as a whole, Texas’ most recent revision of its death penalty 
procedures seems to pass muster under a reasonable reading of Penry II.  
Although jurors still might choose to express their moral response to 
Penry’s mental disability by answering “no” to the question regarding 
his future dangerousness, thus engaging in “nullification” of an objective 
question,258 this is not the only vehicle for the jurors’ moral judgment.  
Jurors can acknowledge Penry’s likely future dangerousness as well as 
his (arguendo) diminished moral blameworthiness due to his mental 
condition, which seems to satisfy O’Connor’s concerns.259 
                                                          
Sess. 2001) 
 253. That jurors might use this question as an opportunity to decide that the defendant is not 
morally blameworthy is bolstered by the statutory language which provides that “members of the 
jury need not agree on what particular evidence supports a negative answer to any issue submitted 
under Subsection (b)[.]”   TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(d)(3) (Vernon, WESTLAW 
through Reg. Sess. 2001) 
 254. Penry II, 532 U.S. 782, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1920 (2001). 
 255.  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(e)(1) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. 
Sess. 2001) 
 256. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(e)(1) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. 
Sess. 2001) 
 257.  TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(f)(4) (Vernon, WESTLAW through Reg. 
Sess. 2001) 
 258. Assuming, arguendo, the fact of Penry’s future dangerousness.  Indeed, there is no way to 
prevent this possibility, just like the possibility of nullification acquittals.  See supra notes 220-46 
and accompanying text. 
 259. There is some question raised by the provision in the Texas law that the 1999 amendment 
only applies to crimes committed after its effective date.  What procedure will the Penry court apply 
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C.  Do “Evolving Standards of Decency” Mandate Reversal of Penry I? 
1.  McCarver/Atkins 
In the near future, the Court may reconsider its earlier determina-
tion260 that the “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibition of the Eighth 
Amendment does not categorically prohibit the execution of the mental-
ly retarded.  On March 26, 2001, the day before hearing oral arguments 
in Penry II, the Court granted certiorari in the case of Ernest McCarver, 
a North Carolina man sentenced to death for a 1987 killing.261  
McCarver’s appeal, unlike Penry II, placed the Eighth Amendment issue 
squarely before the Court by asking whether “national standards have 
evolved such that executing a mentally retarded man would violate” the 
Constitution.262 
On August 4, 2001, North Carolina Governor Michael F. Easley 
signed into law Session Law 2001-346: An Act to Provide That a Men-
tally Retarded Person Convicted of First Degree Murder Shall Not Be 
Sentenced To Death.263  That bill provides in substance that 
“[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no defendant 
who is mentally retarded shall be sentenced to death.”264  Mental Retar-
dation is defined by the statute as “[s]ignificantly subaverage general in-
tellectual functioning, existing concurrently with significant limitations 
in adaptive functioning, both of which were manifested before the age of 
eighteen (18).”265  Consistent with modern behavioral sciences’ under-
standing of mental retardation, this definition involves three prongs: 1) 
impaired intellectual function; 2) impaired adaptive function; and 3) 
manifestation during the developmental period, before the age of majori-
ty.266  Although absolute bans on the execution of the mentally retarded 
have been criticized on the grounds of difficulty of applying the label 
“Mental Retardation” to a wide spectrum of human developmental im-
pairments,267 the North Carolina law attempts to mitigate this difficulty 
                                                          
on remand for re-sentencing? 
 260. Penry I, 492 U.S. at 302, 340 (1989). 
 261. McCarver v. North Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001). 
 262. Laurie Asseo, U.S. Supreme Court to Review Death Penalty for Retarded (March 26, 
2001), at http://www.law.com. 
 263. An Act to Provide that a Mentally Retarded Person Shall Not Be Sentenced to Death, 
2001 N.C. SESS. LAWS S. L. 2001-346 (WESTLAW 2001). 
 264. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(b) (WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-346). 
 265.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(a) (WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-346). 
 266. DSM-IV, supra note 39, at 40-46. 
 267. See supra notes 40-55 and accompanying text. 
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by defining the component parts of its definition of mental retardation.  
“Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning” is defined as 
“[a]n intelligence quotient of seventy (70) or below,”268 and 
“[s]ignificant limitations in adaptive functioning” is defined as 
“[s]ignificant limitations in two or more of the following adaptive skill 
areas:” communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community 
use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure skills 
an work skills.”  Thus, substituting the definitions for their operative 
terms in the statutory definition of mental retardation, North Carolina 
deems to be mentally retarded an individual with an IQ of seventy (70) 
or below and significant limitations in two or more adaptive skill areas, 
both of which manifested before the age of eighteen (18). 
Under the new North Carolina law, a capital defendant who wants 
to raise mental retardation as a defense to the imposition of the death 
penalty has three chances to do so.  First, the defendant may by motion 
request the court to hold a pretrial hearing for the purpose of determining 
the defendant’s mental condition.269  The statutory language is unclear 
whether this hearing is mandatory or discretionary with the trial judge; 
the statute provides that, upon motion by the defendant, “the court may 
order a pretrial hearing to determine if the defendant is mentally retard-
ed.”270  However, the statute adds that “The court shall order such a 
hearing with the consent of the State.”271  This may mean that the court 
has discretion to order the hearing, unless the State and defendant concur 
that a hearing is appropriate, in which case the hearing becomes manda-
tory.  At this hearing, the defendant has the burden of proving mental re-
tardation by clear and convincing evidence.272  If the defendant carries 
this burden, the State is barred from seeking the death penalty against 
the defendant.273 If the defendant does not carry his burden of proof, the 
case may continue as a capital case. 
The next opportunity for the defendant to raise the issue of his men-
tal capacity274 arises after the guilt phase of the trial, at the sentencing 
hearing.  If the defendant chooses to introduce evidence of his mental 
retardation, the court must submit a special issue to the jury prior to the 
                                                          
 268. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(a)(1)(c) (WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-346). 
 269.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(c) (WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-346).  Such a motion 
must be supported by “appropriate” affidavits. 
 270. § 15A-2005(c) (emphasis added). 
 271. § 15A-2005(c) (emphasis added). 
 272. § 15A-2005(c). 
 273. Id. § 15A-2005(c). 
 274. Assuming failure of the defendant’s pretrial motion. 
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jury’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating evidence.275  Presum-
ably, this is meant to insulate the jury’s determination of mental capacity 
from potentially prejudicial evidence of the aggravating or mitigating 
factors present in the case.  At this stage, the defendant has the burden of 
proving his mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence.276  If 
the defendant carries his lessened burden at this stage of the proceedings, 
the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment without further consid-
eration of aggravating or mitigating factors.277 
If the defendant fails to convince either judge or jury of his mental 
retardation at either stage of the proceedings discussed to this point, his 
final chance comes in the sentencing phase of the trial, with the intro-
duction of mitigating evidence.278  Consistent with Supreme Court guid-
ance requiring unfettered jury consideration of mitigating circumstances, 
a negative finding as to mental retardation on the jury’s special issue279 
does not preclude the jury from considering the defendant’s evidence as 
to his mental condition as mitigating evidence, or from the defendant ar-
guing that, even if the jury does not agree that his mental condition rises 
to the level of mental retardation as defined in the statute, his mental 
condition should still be the grounds for a sentence of life imprisonment 
rather than death.280  As with other types of mitigating or aggravating 
evidence that might be presented as part of a sentencing determination, 
there is no formal burden of proof at this stage; rather, the jury is to ex-
press its “reasoned moral response” to the totality of the evidence placed 
before it. 
The pretrial and sentencing formalities of the new North Carolina 
law apply to trials beginning on or after October 1, 2001.281  However, 
North Carolina included a provision in its statute by which those tried 
and/or convicted before October 1, 2001 can obtain the benefit of this 
limitation retroactively.  New Section 51A-2006 of the N.C Code pro-
vides that a defendant convicted of capital murder and sentenced to 
death may seek “appropriate relief from the defendant’s death sen-
tence”282 by filing a motion with the court on or before January 31, 
2002, or within 120 days of the termination of the defendant’s trial (for 
                                                          
 275.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(e) (WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-346). 
 276.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(f) (WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-346). 
 277. § 15A-2005(e). 
 278.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(g) (WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-346). 
 279. § 15A-2005(e). 
 280. § 15A-2005(g). 
 281. 2001 N.C. SESS. LAWS S. L. 2001-346 § 4 (WESTLAW 2001). 
 282. Appropriate relief would presumably be an order commuting the defendant’s sentence to 
life imprisonment rather than death. 
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cases pending on October 1, 2001).283  At a hearing on such a motion, 
the defendant has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt284 
that the defendant was mentally retarded at the time of the crime for 
which the death penalty was imposed.285 
Upon being informed of the passage and implementation of the 
North Carolina law, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari 
in the case of McCarver v. North Carolina286 as moot. At the same time, 
however, the Court granted certiorari in the case of Atkins v. Virginia.287 
On August 16, 1996, Daryl Renard Atkins kidnapped and murdered 
Eric Nesbitt during the course of a robbery.288  Atkins was convicted of 
the murder289 and sentenced to death.290  During the penalty phase of the 
trial, Atkins introduced evidence to show that he had an IQ of 59 and 
was “mildly mentally retarded.”291 
The jury was instructed, consistent with Virginia law, that the pros-
ecution bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that either 
Atkins would likely commit future violent crimes “that would constitute 
a continuing serious threat to society”292 or that Atkins’ conduct in 
committing the offense for which he was convicted was “outrageously or 
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.”293  The jury was not instructed that 
if it found neither of the statutory aggravating factors to be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt, it was required to return a sentence of life im-
prisonment.294  The jury found that both aggravating factors had been 
proven, and imposed a sentence of death.295 
On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Atkins argued that his 
low IQ score and mild mental retardation prohibited his execution, on 
the grounds that the punishment would be disproportionate to the crime.  
According to Atkins, the Commonwealth of Virginia had never before 
                                                          
 283.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2006(2) (WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-346). 
 284.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1420 (WEST through S. L. 2001-450). 
 285.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2006(1) (WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-346). 
 286. McCarver v. North Carolina, 122 S. Ct. 22 (2001). 
 287. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312 (V. 2000), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 24 (2001). 
 288. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 449-450. 
 289. Id. at 453. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 451 (according to the testimony of Dr. Evan Stuart Nelson, a forensic psychologist).  
Dr. Evans conceded that neither competency nor insanity were issues in Atkins’ case.  Id. 
 292. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (LEXIS through 2001 Legis. Sess.). 
 293. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (LEXIS through 2001 Legis. Sess.). 
 294. Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 453. 
 295. Although Atkins’ first death sentence was remanded due to an error in the jury instruc-
tions, the second jury on remand imposed a death sentence based on its finding that the prosecution 
had carried its burden of proof with respect to both statutory aggravating factors.  Atkins v. Com-
monwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 2000). 
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imposed a death sentence on a defendant with such a low IQ score.296  
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the sentence on Sept 15, 2000, 
noting that under Penry I, mental retardation alone does not justify 
commutation of a death sentence; that the evidence presented to the jury 
was in conflict regarding Atkins’ mental retardation, and that “the jury 
was instructed . . . . . . to consider any evidence in mitigation of the of-
fense, and the jury obviously found that Atkins’ IQ score did not miti-
gate his culpability for the murder.”297  Accordingly, the court conclud-
ed, “considering ‘both the crime and the defendant,’ . . . . . . we cannot 
say that Atkins’ sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to 
sentences generally imposed” in comparable cases.298  Two Justices, dis-
senting, wrote that “it is indefensible to conclude that individuals who 
are mentally retarded are not to some degree less culpable for their crim-
inal acts. . . . [T]he execution of a mentally retarded individual rather 
than the imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole 
is excessive.”299 
Should the Court decide that developments since Penry I justify a 
reversal of its opinion in that case that insufficient national standards ex-
ist to prohibit such executions, the issues raised by Penry II will be sup-
plemented by new issues and difficulties, such as the difficulty of draw-
ing a line at the point where mental disability justifies exemption from 
capital punishment. 
2.  Evolving Standards of Decency 
In the twelve years since Penry I, other courts have had occasion to 
consider whether, as Penry I anticipated, the evolving standards of de-
cency300 have progressed to the point where the Eighth Amendment 
should bar execution of the mentally retarded, and other state legisla-
tures have had the opportunity to respond to Penry I’s implicit invitation 
to consider the issue.301 
                                                          
 296. Id. at 318. 
 297. Id. at 320. 
 298. Id. at 321. 
 299. Id. at 325 (Koontz and Hassell, J., dissenting). 
 300. Trop v. Dulles, 356 US 86, 101 (1958). 
 301. For discussion of the evolving standards of decency on this issue, see generally Entzeroth, 
supra note 55 (concluding that the current Court is unlikely to find a national consensus to exist), 
Duplar, supra note 6 (suggesting that the Court’s methodology of looking primarily to state legisla-
tures for “objective” evidence of a national consensus is flawed, and that other methodologies, in-
cluding public opinion polling, show a clear national consensus against execution of the mentally 
retarded). 
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As discussed above,302 the United States is the only western democ-
racy which allows the execution of the mentally retarded.  In 1989, only 
Georgia, Maryland and the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988303 pro-
hibited the execution of the mentally retarded.  Today, at least thirteen 
(13) states304 and the federal government305 specifically prohibit the exe-
cution of mentally retarded criminal defendants.306  Further, public opin-
ion polls consistently show that, even when there is strong support for 
the death penalty in general, that support does not extend to the execu-
tion of the mentally retarded.307  At least one state Supreme Court justice 
has concluded that there is a post-Penry I consensus against execution of 
the mentally retarded.308 
There is certainly evidence that the national consensus is not unan-
imous.  The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, in Lambert v. 
State,309  affirmed a death sentence imposed on a mentally retarded man, 
on the ground that Oklahoma statutes only prohibit execution for insane, 
as opposed to mentally retarded, convicts.310  On June 17, 2001, the 
Governor of Texas vetoed a bill which would have prohibited execution 
of the mentally ill by making a determination of mental illness a matter 
for the court, not the jury.311  However, the Governor justified that veto 
                                                          
 302. Supra sec. II., C. 
 303. 102 Stat. 4390 (1988). 
 304. Maryland, Georgia, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, New York, Tennessee, Washington 
 305. In addition to the Federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 now provides that “A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon 
a person who is mentally retarded.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 3596(c) (West, WESTLAW through S. L. 2001-
346). 
 306. See supra note 36.  In addition, as of the end of 2000, thirteen jurisdictions have abolished 
the death penalty.  Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 4. 
 307.  Duplar, supra note 6.  See also Haynes, supra note 243 at 93 (1986 survey in Florida re-
vealed only 28% favored execution of those with a history of mental illness, and only 12% favored 
execution in cases of mentally retarded inmates.) 
 308. People v. Smithy, 978 P.2d 1171, 1224 (Cal. 1999) (Mosk, J., concurring) (Today, . . . I 
would hold that the cruel and unusual punishments clause now prohibits execution of a sentence of 
death against mentally retarded persons.”), But see Entzeroth, supra note 55, at 934-38 (current 
Court unlikely to find a consensus based on Penry I methodology.) 
 309. 984 P.2d 221 (1999). 
 310. Id. at 246 (Lumpkin, J., concurring). 
 311. Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas regarding HB236 (June 17, 2001) (at 
http://www.governor.state.tx.us/current_events/veto.htm).  See also Jane Elliott and Matt Schwartz, 
Perry Vetoes Execution Exemption, Says Decision on Retarded Should Remain With Jury, HOUS. 
CHRON., June 18, 2001 at 1, available at 2001 WL 23608508; Jane Elliott, More Heat Hits Gov. 
Perry on Retarded-Execution Bill, HOUS. CHRON., June 16, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 
3028486; Jane Elliott, Prosecutors Urge Perry to Veto Bill to Ban Execution of Retarded, HOUS. 
CHRON. June 7, 2001 at 35, available at 2001 WL 3026514; John Williams, Perry Threatens Veto 
of Execution Bill, Protections for Mentally Retarded Already in Place, Governor Says, HOUS. 
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by claiming that “this bill is not about whether to execute the mentally 
retarded.  We do not now execute the mentally retarded.”312  Governor 
Perry claimed that the existing Texas statutory scheme,313 which asks ju-
rors to determine whether any mitigating evidence, including evidence 
of mental retardation or capacity, justifies the imposition of a sentence of 
life imprisonment rather than death, amounted to a de facto ban on the 
execution of the mentally retarded.  Although other observers of the his-
tory of Texas’ death penalty jurisprudence might disagree with the Gov-
ernor, it is worthy of comment that the Governor of arguably the most 
pro-death penalty state in the country felt the need to justify his veto and 
make clear that he was not expressing support for the execution of the 
mentally retarded.  Even in light of the veto, this may be additional evi-
dence of the emergence of a national consensus. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Penry marks a partial rejection of the formalism of the legal fiction 
in capital sentencing cases, and a step toward realization of the promise 
of individualized consideration and “rational moral response” to capital 
crimes.  Ultimately, a legal fiction is merely a bridge to real reform of 
unjust laws or unjust applications of the laws.  It remains to be seen 
whether the Supreme Court will act to bring about real reform in the 
near future and bring the United States into parity with the rest of the 
developed world in humane treatment of its mentally ill offenders. 
                                                          
CHRON., May 31, 2001 at 25, available at 2001 WL 3024705. 
 312. Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas regarding HB236 (June 17, 2001) (at 
http://www.governor.state.tx.us/current_events/veto.htm).  See also Jane Elliott and Matt Schwartz, 
Perry Vetoes Execution Exemption, Says Decision on Retarded Should Remain With Jury, HOUS. 
CHRON., June 18, 2001 at 1, available at 2001 WL 23608508; Jane Elliott, More Heat Hits Gov. 
Perry on Retarded-Execution Bill, HOUS. CHRON., June 16, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 
3028486; Jane Elliott, Prosecutors Urge Perry to Veto Bill to Ban Execution of Retarded, HOUS. 
CHRON. June 7, 2001 at 35, available at 2001 WL 3026514; John Williams, Perry Threatens Veto 
of Execution Bill, Protections for Mentally Retarded Already in Place, Governor Says, HOUS. 
CHRON., May 31, 2001 at 25, available at 2001 WL 3024705. 
 313. See supra notes 170 and 242 and accompanying text. 
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